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Mediation traditionally has been regarded as a private, extra-legal
institution. Recently, however, legal regulation of mediation has
evolved. Yet, under the conventional private approach, mediation law
focuses almost exclusively on the mediator-parties relations, and leaves
the internal relationship between the mediating parties and the post-
mediation contract to be governed by conventional contract law.
In this article we challenge the conventional private, contractual
approaches to mediation and advance, in their stead, an innovative
communitarian theory of mediation that focuses not only on the
mediation process, but also on the post-mediation contracts. Drawing
on insights from social psychology and public policy, our analysis
uncovers the substantial public components of mediation. We show that
mediating parties perceive mediation as a community act that affects
their self-identity as community members. We thus argue that the legal
encouragement of mediation should be accompanied by the appropriate
mechanisms to ensure procedural justice as well as fair outcomes.
Based on this communitarian theory, the article develops a new
mediation regime designed to preserve mediation as an institution that
is different from court litigation while preventing it from becoming a site
of exploitation and injustice. The communitarian regime encompasses
not only the mediator-parties' relationship but also the internal
relationship between the mediating parties, thus offering a unique
contractual regime that subjects mediation's procedural justice as well
as its substantive outcomes to judicial review. Furthermore, while
prevailing law separates mediators' duties from the internal
relationship between the mediating parties, under the proposed regime,
a violation of mediation law by the mediator could impact the legal
validity of the entire mediation process, including the post-mediation
contract.
The article also addresses, and then rejects, the standard objections
to judicial review, which raise concerns that judicial review harms
mediations' confidentiality and finality, thereby increasing their cost
and discouraging litigants from participating in mediation. We propose
a novel mechanism of optional ex ante substantive court approval of
post-mediation contracts, demonstrating that, when properly used, this
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mechanism together with the ex post special contractual regime are
likely to enhance parties' willingness to participate in mediation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past few decades, mediation has become a central tool of
dispute resolution.' Traditionally, mediation was regarded as a private, extra-
legal procedure. Recently, however, legal scholars have partially recognized
the state's public responsibility to ensure that mediation proceedings,
especially court-annexed mediation, are conducted in a fair and just manner,2
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1 In a recent survey, data suggests that the trend today is definitely towards
mediation with approximately half of the states having partial or total court-ordered
mediation programs. See Peter S. Chantilis, Mediation U.S.A., 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 1031,
1033 (1996). The use of mediation to resolve disputes is so prevalent "that litigation is
the alternative way to resolve a dispute." See id. at 1034 (citing Roger Fisher, Comments,
Harvard Negot. Workshop). In Florida in 1995, for example, over 75,000 cases were
mediated through court-connected mediation. See Sharon Press, Institutionalization:
Savior or Saboteur of Mediation?, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 903, 907 (1997); see also
Sharon Press, Institutionalization of Mediation in Florida: At the Crossroads, 108 PENN
ST. L. REv. 43, 55 (2003) (finding that over 76,000 cases were mediated in court-
connected mediation in 2002). It is important to note that Florida's "official" statistics
only tell part of the story because of the extensive use of private mediators across the
state, even in cases of court-ordered mediation. See generally Earnestine Reshard,
Florida Mediation & Arbitration Programs: A Compendium, DiSP. RESOL. CTR. (19th ed.
2006), available at www.flcourts.org/gen_public/adr/bin/2006Compendium.pdf
(gathering statistics on the caseload in court-annexed mediation programs).
2 See, e.g., Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of
Alternative Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REv. 949 (2000)
(arguing that court-ordered mediation should be subject to the constitutional due-process
requirements); Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What's
Justice Got to Do with It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787 (2001) (arguing that mediation should
offer disputants an experience of procedural justice).
668
[ Vol. 25:3 20101
A COMMUNITARIAN THEORY OF POST-MEDIATION CONTRACTS
thus legal regulation of mediation has evolved. 3 Yet, the dominant approach
still perceives mediation as private and contractual. 4 Following this dominant
approach, mediation law focuses almost exclusively on mediator-party
relations,5 and leaves both the relationship between the mediating parties and
the post-mediation contract to be governed by conventional contract law. 6
3 See, e.g., UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT § § 1-17 (2003), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edulbll/archives/ulc/mediat/2003finaldraft.htm; see also infra Part
II.A.
4 See James R. Coben, Gollum, Meet Smeagol: A Schizophrenic Rumination on
Mediator Values Beyond Self-Determination and Neutrality, 5 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 65, 66 (2004) ("The evolution of mediation, from empowerment/community roots
to corporate/court sustenance, is no surprise given the nation's journey through the
Reagan revolution, the ideology of free markets, and the Supreme Court's unbridled
support for freedom to contract in disputing."); Stephen N. Subrin, A Traditionalist Looks
at Mediation: It's Here to Stay and Much Better than I Thought, 3 NEv. L.J. 196, 215
(2002) ("One should also consider the attraction of the free market theories that have
dominated the ideological landscape for the past twenty-five years, and their emphasis on
individual agency and choice. Part of the attraction of mediation to lawyers and their
clients is that they help choose the mediator, as opposed to being assigned randomly to a
judge; they retain power over the final disposition of the dispute; and can leave the
mediation at will.").
5 See, e.g., CAL. R. CT. 1620, available at
http://www.mediationtools.com/rules/crcl620.html; VA. STANDARDS OF ETHICS AND
PROF'L RESP. FOR CERTIFIED MEDIATORS, available at
http://www.courts.state.va.us/courtadmin/aoc/djs/programs/drs/mediation/soe.html;
MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS (2005), available at
http://www.abanet.org/dispute/news/ModelStandardsofConductforMediatorsfinal05.pdf;
FL. R. CERTIFIED & COURT-APPOINTED MEDIATORS (2000), available at
http://www.flcourts.org/genpublic/adr/certrules.shtml; TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 154 (Vernon 2005), available at
http://www.statutes.legis.state.tx.us/Docs/CP/htm/CP.154.htm; see also THE UNIFORM
MEDIATION ACT (2003) (dealing almost exclusively with mediation confidentiality and
still refers in § 9 to the mediator's duty to disclose conflicts of interest). See generally
Jack M. Sabatino, ADR as "Litigation Lite": Procedural and Evidentiary Norms
Embedded Within Alternative Dispute Resolution, 47 EMORY L.J. 1289 (1998)
(discussing the procedural aspects of alternative dispute resolution processes); Paula M.
Young, Take It or Leave It. Lump It or Grieve It: Designing Mediator Complaint Systems
that Protect Mediators, Unhappy Parties, Attorneys, Courts, the Process, and the Field,
21 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 721 (2006) (reviewing the regulation of mediators and the
mechanisms for monitoring their performance).
6 Unlike the tendency of current law to ignore the unique features of the post-
mediation contract, prevailing mediation law recognizes that the original mediation
agreement-i.e., the agreement to go to mediation-should be enforced according to
special rules. See generally Amy J. Schmitz, Confronting ADR Agreements Contract/No
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Furthermore, as the existing law separates mediators' duties and the internal
relationship between the mediating parties, at times, even gross violation of
mediation law by the mediator has no impact on the legal validity of the post-
mediation contract between the parties.7 Thus post-mediation contracts are
enforced despite claims that the mediator made misrepresentations at the
mediation,8 violated his neutrality,9 or coerced one of the parties into
accepting the agreement.' 0 Needless to say, when mediation procedure is
Contract Conundrum with Good Faith, 56 DEPAuL L. REV. 55 (2006) (critiquing
ambiguity regarding enforceability of ADR agreements).
7 See infra Part II.B.
8 See, e.g., Brinkerhoff v. Campbell, 994 P.2d 911 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (claiming
that the mediator made statements based on mistaken beliefs about the policy limits);
Chitkara v. New York Tel. Co., 45 Fed. Appx. 53 (2d Cir. 2002) (post-mediation contract
was enforced despite claims of misrepresentation by the mediator during mediation
process). In Chitkara, the court ruled that
[t]he nature of mediation is such that a mediator's statement regarding the predicted
litigation value of a claim, where that prediction is based on a fact that can readily
be verified, cannot be relied on by a counseled litigant whose counsel is present at
the time the statement is made.
Id. at 55; Holmes v. Potter, No. 2:05 cv 447 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18009 (N.D. Ind.
Mar. 12, 2007) (post-mediation contract was approved by the court despite claims of
misrepresentation by the mediator while meeting with Holmes). In Holmes the court
ruled that:
[e]ven assuming that the mediator mistakenly represented to Holmes that this
deduction would not be made in his case, and further assuming Holmes could clear
the hearsay objections to this evidence, evidence of the mediator's conduct remains
outside the scope of admissible evidence because this agreement is not ambiguous.
Id. at *16.
9 See, e.g., Wolf v. Wolf, No. B177351, 2006 WL 171513 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 25,
2006) (enforcing the post-mediation contract despite the fact that the mediator
communicated privately only with one of the parties' attorney regarding the agreement
details as the other party failed to establish the mediator's awareness of the fact that she
had retained an attorney at the time). Even in cases like Lehrer v. Zwernemann, 14
S.W.3d 775 (Tex. App. 2000), where the mediator fails to disclose his relationship with a
party's counsel, the other party can sue the mediator, but cannot under the existing legal
regime challenge the validity of the post-mediation contract.
10 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Banks, 887 S.W.2d 160, 163-64 (Tex. App. 1994)
(ruling that duress or undue influence can suffice to set aside a contract, but it is well-
established that the action must originate from one of the parties to the contract, for
courts will not invalidate contracts on grounds of duress when the alleged duress claim is
made by a third person who has no involvement with the opposite party to the contract).
The courts will, however, sometimes allow the nullification of an agreement in light of
the mediator's conduct. See, e.g., Vitakis-Valchine v. Valchine, 793 So. 2d 1094 (Fla.
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followed, the post-mediation contract is enforced according to regular
contract doctrines,11 without special review of parties' reciprocal conduct or
substantive scrutiny of the contract's contents. 12
In contrast with the private conception of mediation, this article proposes
a communitarian theory of mediation and post-mediation contracts. Drawing
on insights from social psychology and public policy, our analysis uncovers
the substantial public components of mediation. The social psychology claim
is based on innovative theories dealing with the individual's identity in a
group, particularly group value and interactional theories of procedural
justice,13 and on empirical studies that focus specifically on the mediation
process. 14 Drawing on these theories and studies, we argue that in certain
Dist. Ct. App. 2001). Such instances, however, are still far and few between and there are
no over-arching normative framework to give them force. See also infra Part IV.B.4.
11 See, e.g., Patel v. Ashco Enter., Inc., 711 So. 2d 239, 240 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1998) ("While a settlement agreement may be a basis on which a judgment may be
entered, it is also a contract between the parties, the enforceability of which is governed
by the laws of contract."); see also Bateski v. Ransom, 658 So. 2d 630, 631 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1995) ("Settlement agreements are governed by the laws of contracts. . ."). But see
Peter N. Thompson, Enforcing Rights Generated in Court-Connected Mediation-
Tension Between the Aspirations of a Private Facilitative Process and the Reality of
Public Adversarial Justice, 19 OHO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 509, 550-55 (2004) (claiming
that a subjective law should be applied to post-mediation contracts, which would reflect
the true will of the parties and give effect to their self-determination, in contrast to classic
contract law, which is based on objective tests); Steven Weller, Court Enforcement of
Mediated Agreements: Should Contract Law Be Applied?, 31 JUDGES J. 13, 38-39 (1992)
(proposing a different way of understanding the post-mediation contract due to mediation
confidentiality and the presence of the mediator at the negotiations); Nancy A. Welsh,
The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court-Connected Mediation: The
Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?, 6 HARVARD NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 86-92 (2001)
(claiming that given the concern of improper conduct on the part of the mediator, which
will prevent the parties from realizing their self-determination, it is appropriate to set a
three-day "cooling-off' period from the point of signature of the mediation agreement
until the formulation of an enforceable contract, during which each side can back out of
the agreement).
12 In many instances, the insistence on confidentiality renders public scrutiny of the
post-mediation contract even narrower than what is allowed under conventional contract
law, as it prevents details of what transpires in the mediation from being revealed. See
infra Part IV.C.
1 3 See E. ALLEN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE 230-42 (1988); see also Welsh, supra note 2 at 827-34 (applying the group
value theory to the regulation of mediation); infra Part III.A. 1.
14 See, e.g., Tina Nabatchi & Lisa B. Bingham, Expanding Our Models ofJustice in
Dispute Resolution: A Field Test of the Contribution of Interactional Justice (2002),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract-305205 (suggesting that an interactional model of
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types of mediations, especially in court-annexed mediation, the mediator is
perceived as a community representative. The presence of a mediator thus
turns mediation into a public procedure in the eyes of the participants.
Accordingly, mediating parties do not perceive mediation processes and
outcomes as a private matter between disputants; rather, the mediation
substantially affects their personal identity and sense of belonging within the
general community.15 We further argue that full awareness of the impact of
mediation on the parties' social identity should result in comprehensive
regulation that encompasses not only the mediation proceedings and
mediator-parties relations but also the post-mediation contract.
The public policy analysis adds another dimension to the communitarian
vision of mediation in arguing that not only from the psychological-
subjective perspective but also from objective public policy viewpoint,
mediation involves substantive public components. We argue that public
intervention in mediation, and, in particular, the law's promotion and
validation of the proceeding, should lead to the state's shouldering moral
responsibility for the fairness of the mediation process and its outcomes.
Thus, we maintain that severe violation of the mediation rules by the
mediator undermines the entire moral basis of the mediation, and hence both
the process and its outcomes should be annulled. Furthermore, we assert that
the modem regulation of the procedure of mediation' 6 is not sufficient in
itself, and must be supplemented by a substantive review of the post-
mediation contract fairness in order to prevent exploitation and injustice.
Within the existing law, we show that despite official denial of any link
between the mediation process and post-mediation contract in a wide range
of cases, the mediation context does in fact influence the legal regulation that
governs the relations between the mediating parties. Unfortunately this
impact takes an undesirable path, narrowing the legal monitoring of the
parties' relationship and the mediation outcome, instead of deepening public
supervision of the post-mediation contract. At times, for example, mediation
confidentiality has prevented parties from making claims that are admissible
justice, which includes measures of empowerment and recognition, can explain
participants' satisfaction with mediation); see also infra Part 1II.B.1.(b).
15 A few recent studies have revealed the importance of these theories to the
regulation of mediation. See, e.g., Welsh, supra note 2. The existing approaches apply
those theories only to the procedural aspects of mediation and to the mediator-parties
relationship.
16 See supra note 5.
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under conventional contract law, such as claims of bad faith,'7 mistake, or
misrepresentation as grounds for nullifying the post-mediation contract.18
Based on the communitarian theory, the article develops a detailed
regulatory regime. Our proposed regulation regime translates procedural
justice principles (such as informed consent, voice, respect, trust, and
impartiality) into enforceable legal norms. Unlike existing regulation, the
communitarian regime covers not only the mediator-parties' relationship but
also the internal relationship between the mediating parties, thus offering a
special contractual law regime that governs the post-mediation contract. This
special contractual regime subjects the mediation process as well as its
substantive outcomes to judicial review according to the merits of mediation.
Furthermore, while existing law separates mediators' duties from the internal
relationship between the mediating parties, under the proposed regime
violation of mediation law by the mediator might impact the validity of the
whole mediation, including the post-mediation contract.
We also address and reject the standard objections to judicial review of
mediation which raise concerns that judicial review harms mediation
confidentiality and finality, thereby increasing its cost and discouraging
litigants from participating in mediation. We propose a novel mechanism of
optional ex ante substantive court approval of post-mediation contracts. We
demonstrate that when properly used, the ex ante approval mechanisms
together with the ex post special contractual regime, are likely to enhance
parties' willingness to participate in mediation. The article proceeds as
follows: Part II describes the conventional approach that holds the post-
mediation contract to be a private contract; Part III presents our
communitarian conception of mediation, with its innovative approach to the
post-mediation contract; and Part IV applies this approach and demonstrates
its potential for improving existing law. The article concludes by arguing that
the new mediation regime should preserve mediation as an institution that is
separate from court litigation while preventing it from becoming a site of
exploitation and injustice.
17 See, e.g., Foxgate Homeowners' Ass'n v. Bramalea Cal., Inc., 25 P.3d 1117, 1119
(Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (ruling that "[n]either a mediator nor a party may reveal
communications made during mediation"); In re Acceptance Ins. Co., 33 S.W.3d 443,
451-54 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000) (ruling that "the manner in which participants negotiate
should not be disclosed to the trial court.").
18 See, e.g., Vick v. Waits, No. 05-00-01122-CV, 2002 WL 1163842, at *11 (Tex.
App. June 4, 2002) ("The Texas ADR Act does not include an exception for claims of
fraud, and this Court will not create an exception to the confidentiality provisions of the
Texas ADR Act. Because all of the alleged misrepresentations were made during
mediation, these statements are confidential . . ").
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II. THE CONVENTIONAL APPROACH: THE POST-MEDIATION CONTRACT
AS A PRIVATE AGREEMENT
A. Mediation: Between Privatization and Regulation
Mediation procedure has evolved considerably in the United States since
about 1970.19 Traditionally, mediation had been conceived of as an extra-
legal mechanism for dispute resolution, perhaps even in rivalry with the
conventional legal system.20 Ironically, however, despite its underlying
extra-legal aspirations, over the last decades, mediation has gained increasing
support from the legal system. The legal system, in particular legislatures and
courts, has tended to encourage mediation in a number of ways, including
through economic21 and legal22 incentives, and in many jurisdictions even
compelling parties to try to resolve disputes through mediation.23 The trend
towards mediation has often been described as part of a broader privatization
process,24 which transfers government functions into private bodies.25 Thus,
19 See Frank E.A. Sander, The Future ofADR, 2000 J. DisP. REsOL. 3, 4 (describing
the evolution of ADR processes, especially mediation, over the last decades).
20 See Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution
and Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 211, 253-61 (1995) (discussing the
interrelationship between ADR and adjudication). See generally Michael Alberstein,
Forms of Mediation and Law: Cultures of Dispute Resolution, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP.
RESOL. 321 (2006) (providing a map of mediation models and analyzing the intellectual
context from which they emerged); Symposium, Competing and Complementary Rule
Systems: Civil Procedure & ADR, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 481 (2005).
21 See Wayne D. Brazil, Should Court-Sponsored ADR Survive?, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 241, 242-45 (2006) (discussing the reasons for court-sponsored ADR
programs).
22 The first and foremost legal incentive is the confidentiality protection extended to
information revealed during mediation. See UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT (2003); infra Part
IV.C.
23 See Holly A. Streeter-Schaefer, A Look at Mandated Civil Mediation, 49 DRAKE
L. REv. 367, 372-77 (2001) (reviewing the legislation dealing with mandatory
mediation).
24 See, e.g., Chris A. Carr & Michael R. Jencks, The Privatization of Business and
Commercial Dispute Resolution: A Misguided Policy Decision, 88 KY. L.J. 183 (1999)
(criticizing the trend of privatization of business and commercial dispute resolution and
suggesting proposals for reform); Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992
Wis. L. REv. 1443, 1503 (describing the trend toward mediation in modem family law as
part of the general privatization trend); Jack B. Weinstein, Some Benefits and Risks of
Privatization of Justice Through ADR, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. REsOL. 241 (1996)
(emphasizing the negative implications of privatized justice).
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the justification for the legal support of mediation is usually founded on a
general ideology that supports privatization, in particular, the need to
reinforce the parties' individual autonomy, reliance, and self-determination. 26
Additionally, mediation is justified by the general pragmatic consideration of
reducing court congestion 27 and the psychological advantages of settling
disputes by way of mediation rather than judicial ruling.28
At some point, however, this trend towards encouraging mediation also
led to concerns over unsuitable mediators29 and inappropriate management of
the mediation proceedings.30 Opponents of mediation specifically fear that
mediation can result in exploitation of power imbalances between the
parties, 31 externalities, 32 and neglect of the court's role to safeguard public
interests and promote social values in general.33
25 See Jody Freeman, Symposium, Public Values in an Era of Privatization:
Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARv. L. REv. 1285, 1287
(2003) (dealing with various definitions of privatization).
26 See generally Alex Wellington, Taking Codes of Ethics Seriously: Alternative
Dispute Resolution and Reconstitutive Liberalism, 12 CAN. J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 297
(1999) (supporting mediation from liberal, pluralistic, and democratic perspectives). See
also Shawn P. Davisson, Privatization and Self-Determination in the Circuits: Utilizing
the Private Sector Within the Evolving Framework of Federal Appellate Mediation, 21
OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. REsOL. 953, 955 (2006) (arguing that "the advent of private
mediation in the federal circuits is a positive development that has the potential to
provide numerous benefits to parties, all a function of self-determination in the process").
27 See George L. Priest, Private Litigation and the Court Congestion Problem, 69
B.U. L. REv. 527, 535-36 (1989) (analyzing the equilibrium effects of delay-reduction
measures). See generally Edward A. Dauer, Justice Irrelevant: Speculations on the
Causes of ADR, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 83 (2000) (arguing that court congestion and
litigation costs explain the advent of the dispute resolution trend).
28 See generally Donna Shestowsky, Procedural Preferences in Alternative Dispute
Resolution: A Closer, Modern Look at an Old Idea, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 211
(2004) (arguing that mediation is litigators' preferred procedure).
29 For example, there is debate over the question of whether the mediator should be
a legalist. See, e.g., Matthew Daiker, No JD. Required: The Critical Role and
Contributions of Non-Lawyer Mediators, 24 REv. LITIG. 499 (2005) (arguing that non-
lawyers should be allowed to mediate disputes).
30 See Charles Pou, Jr., Assuring Excellence, or Merely Reassuring? Policy and
Practice in Promoting Mediator Quality, 2004 J. DISP. REsOL. 303, 309-11 (mapping the
ways in which the dispute resolution field has sought to define and assure mediator
competence); Young, supra note 5 (discussing mechanisms for monitoring mediator
performance).
31 See Richard Delgado, Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice
in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 1359, 1400 (concluding that
informal dispute resolution is likely to disadvantage racial and ethnic minorities); Trina
Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545,
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The current regulation of mediation emerged as part of an effort to
balance between the advantages and disadvantages of mediation.34 Thus, in
recent years, alongside the legal endorsement and encouragement of
mediation, regulation has evolved that prohibits different types of mediator
conduct and creates active mediator duties.35 This regulation includes
requirements for mediator qualifications and training,36 monitoring of
mediator performance,37 and the mediator's duty to ensure the mediating
parties' informed consent,38 self-determination, 39 and access to legal
1551-54 (1991) (discussing mandatory custody mediation in California and its
heightened risks for women). See generally Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly:
Divorce Mediation and the Politics of Power, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 441 (1992) (arguing
against mediation in divorce cases and other family matters involving women); Eric
Yamamoto, ADR: Where Have the Critics Gone?, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1055 (1996)
(reviewing the critical scholarship on ADR).
32 See, e.g., Robert Zeinemann, The Characterization ofPublic Sector Mediation, 24
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y J. 49 (2001) (discussing externalities in public environmental
mediation).
3 See generally Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984)
(rejecting the call to develop ADR programs and to encourage settlements by
emphasizing the public value of litigation).
34 See Freeman, supra note 25, at 1285 (arguing that, in many respects, privatization
eventually turns into "publicization," which enables the law to regulate areas or activities
that were not previously legally regulated).
3S At times, there is disagreement as to the appropriate normative level of regulation
of the mediation process in the context of these relations. See, e.g., Richard C. Reuben,
The Sound of Dust Settling: A Response to Criticisms of the UMA, 2003 J. Disp. RESOL.
99, 101-08 (responding to the criticism of the Uniform Mediation Act and explaining
why disclosure should be not only an ethical obligation but also a statutory legal
requirement).
36 See, e.g., TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. 154.052 (Vernon 2008); FL. R.
CERTIFIED & COURT-APPOINTED MEDIATORS, R. 10.100 (2000), available at
http://www.flcourts.org/gen_public/adr/certrules.shtml. However, in the overwhelming
majority of states, there is no need for a license to practice as a mediator and there are
almost no regulatory entry barriers to the field. See Michael L. Moffitt, The Four Ways to
Assure Mediator Quality (and Why None of Them Work), 24 OmIo ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.
191, 224 (2008) (questioning the government's ability to enforce any barrier to entry into
the field of mediation).
37 Young, supra note 5 (discussing mechanisms for monitoring mediators'
performance).
38 See generally Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Informed Consent in Mediation: A
Guiding Principle for Truly Educated Decision Making, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 775
(1999) (addressing the issue of informed consent in the general mediation context and
emphasizing the role of mediators). See also Lela P. Love & John W. Cooley, The
Intersection of Evaluation by Mediators and Informed Consent: Warring the Unwary, 21
OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 45, 47 (2000) (suggesting ways for mediators to "evaluate"
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counsel. 40 Additional types of regulation aim to ensure the mediator's
impartiality41 as well as the implementation of other procedural justice
principles in the mediation proceedings. 42
B. The Private Conception of the Post-Mediation Contract
The development of mediation regulation focused almost solely on
mediator performance and the mediator-parties relationship, to the near-
complete neglect of the central product of the procedure: the post-mediation
contract. Thus, for example, current mediation law does not provide the court
that enforces the mediation contract with any special tools for its scrutiny;43
nor does it allow the mediating parties to challenge the agreement on any
grounds that deviate from those recognized under prevailing contract law.
Mediation law also fails to set any special interpretation rules for the
mediation settlement agreement or special remedies for its breach.44
Moreover, the case law has to a significant extent detached the regulation of
the mediator-parties' relations from the regulation of the relations between
the mediating parties. As a consequence, legislation and judicial rulings that
deal with the former relationship are not generally applied to the latter. For
the dispute in a manner that is "most constructive to party self-determination, which is
the first principle of mediation.").
39 See, e.g., MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS (2005), available at
http://www.abanet.org/dispute/news/ModelStandardsofConductforMediatorsfmal05.pdf
("A mediator shall conduct a mediation based on the principle of party self-
determination. Self-determination is the act of coming to a voluntary, uncoerced decision
in which each party makes free and informed choices as to process and outcome.")
40 See, e.g., UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT § 10 (2003) ("An attorney or other individual
designated by a party may accompany the party to and participate in a mediation. A
waiver of participation given before the mediation may be rescinded."); FL. R. CERTIFIED
& COURT-APPOINTED MEDIATORS, R. 10.340(a) (2007), available at
http://www.flcourts.org/genpublic/adr/certrules.shtml.
41 See, e.g., CAL. R. CT. R. 3.855 (b)(1) (2007) ("A mediator must make reasonable
efforts to keep informed about matters that reasonably could raise a question about his or
her ability to conduct the proceedings impartially, and must disclose these matters to the
parties.").
42 See Welsh, supra note 2 (applying procedural justice principles to mediation).
43 On the contrary, at times the monitoring is even reduced. See infra Parts III.C.
44 See generally Peter Robinson, Centuries of Contract Common Law Can't Be All
Wrong: Why the UMA's Exception to Mediation Confidentiality in Enforcement
Proceedings Should BeEmbraced and Broadened, 2003 J. DISP. RESOL. 135
(concretizing the application of prevailing contract law to the post-mediation contract by
the division into common categories in contract law: contract-making, flaws in the
contract-making, contract interpretation, invalidation of contract clauses, etc.).
677
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
example, courts validate post-mediation contracts when claims of
misrepresentation are made against the mediator,45 as well as claims of
mediator coercion46 or mediator prejudice during the proceedings.47 As a
general rule, the courts have treated the post-mediation contract in
accordance with conventional contract law.
Mediation law thus includes two contradicting aspects. On the one hand,
modem law distinguishes mediation from regular negotiations and subjects it
to special regulation. On the other hand, the conventional wisdom persists
that mediation is essentially a private process. The law therefore
dichotomizes between the mediator-parties relations and the relations
between the mediating parties themselves, detaching the procedural aspect of
mediation from its substantive product. Under this approach, even if the
mediator's presence justifies regulating the mediator-parties relationship,48
mediation is still a private matter between parties and the post-meditation
contract should still be governed by conventional contract law.
Furthermore, in order to encourage parties to participate in mediation,
mediation law developed the "Finalization Principle" which limits the
possible contractual ground for challenging post-mediation contracts. 49 The
Finalization Principle, together with mediation confidentiality,50 deepens the
"private" conception of mediation. As a result, despite the apparently
45 See, e.g., Chitkara v. New York Tel. Co., 45 Fed. App. 53 (2d Cir. 2002); Holmes
v. Potter, No. 2:05 cv 447, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18009 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 12, 2007).
46 See Lype v. Watkins, No. 01-98-00051-CV, 1998 WL 734429, at *1 (Tex. App.
Oct. 22, 1998) ("Duress or undue influence can suffice to set aside a contract, but it is
well-settled that these must emanate from one who is a party to the contract. Courts will
not invalidate contracts on grounds of duress when the alleged duress derives from a third
person who has no involvement with the opposite party to the contract."); see also
Zimmerman v. Zimmerman, No. 04-04-00347-CV, 2005 WL 1812613 (Tex. App. Aug.
3, 2005) (affirming enforcement of a mediated divorce settlement despite allegations of
mediator coercion); Vela v. Hope Lumber & Supply Co., 966 P.2d 1196 (Okla. Civ. App.
1998) (enforcing the post-mediation agreement despite plaintiff's claim that her attorney,
the mediator, and a third-party had all lied to and threatened her to obtain her consent to
and signature on the agreement); In re Marriage of Banks, 887 S.W.2d 160, 163-64 (Tex.
App. 1994). But see Vitakis-Valchine v. Valchine, 793 So.2d 1094 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2001); infra part IV.B.4.
47 See, e.g., Wolf v. Wolf, No. B177351, 2006 WL 171513 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 25,
2006).
48 See Reuben, supra note 2 (proposing to regulate mediators in court-ordered
mediation due to application of state action doctrine); Welsh, supra note 2 (applying
procedural justice principles to mediation by regulating mediators).
4 9 See infra part IV.B.3.
50 See infra part IV.C.
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increasing regulation of mediation, the public supervision of post-mediation
contracts is less extensive than the public supervision of regular contracts.
III. TOWARDS A COMMUNITARIAN THEORY OF THE POST-MEDIATION
CONTRACT
In this part we present a communitarian theory of mediation that
emphasizes the public role in mediation, in contrast with the private contract
approach to mediation. In Section A, we ground this communitarian theory in
social psychological and public policy approaches, while Section B
demonstrates that this theory should be applied not only to the mediation
proceedings and mediator-parties' relations but also to the regulation of the
post-mediation contract.
A. A Communitarian Theory of Mediation
1. The Social Psychological Perspective: Mediation, Procedural
Justice, and Group Value Theory
The social psychological approach to mediation focuses on the
importance of procedural justice in mediation to the identities of the
individual parties. As opposed to conservative approaches to justice, which
have traditionally focused on the individual's satisfaction with the outcome
of any social interaction, the relatively new approach of procedural justice
theory stresses the tremendous significance of fairness in the dispute
resolution process (e.g., voice, equal treatment, trust, and respect for
parties).51 Adopting this approach, numerous studies have examined the
fairness and reasonableness of the litigation process in the state's courts, as
perceived by the litigating parties. 52 The social psychology of litigating
51 See, e.g., Issachar Rosen-Zvi & Talia Fisher, Overcoming Procedural Boundaries
94 VA. L. REv. 79 (2008) (challenging the dichotomy between criminal and civil
procedure and emphasizing procedural law as a legal field); Welsh, supra note 2, at 817
(reviewing studies that show that from the perspective of the parties in dispute resolution
proceedings, the fairness of the proceedings is as important as fairness of outcome, if not
more so).
52 See, e.g., E. ALLEN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988); JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975). Great importance has been attributed to
strict adherence to procedural justice principles in judicial proceedings, with many
ramifications in a variety of contexts. See generally Laurens Walker, E. Allen Lind &
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parties is two-pronged. The first prong represents the self-interest
instrumentalist approach, according to which the application of procedural
justice principles enables the individual to influence and control the dispute
resolution process, thereby directing it to the best outcome for himself, and
his personal welfare. 53 The second prong is the group value theory, which
was developed primarily by Lind and Tyler.54 This theory focuses on the
impact of procedural justice principles on parties' self-identity in terms of
their status in society. Under group value theory, the dispute resolution forum
is a social institution that, for the disputing parties, represents the community
in its entirety. Hence, what the parties experience during the dispute
resolution process conveys a message to them regarding their social position
and status in the community. The implementation of procedural justice
principles, therefore, signals to the parties that they are respected,
upstanding, and equal members of the community. A failure to apply
procedural justice principles, on the other hand, conveys to the parties the
sense that they are inferior members of the community or that they are not
accepted and lack equal standing in the community. The parties are
significantly impacted by these messages-it impairs their sense of
belonging, the forging of their self-identity, and their self-respect and self-
esteem. 55
The legal discussion of procedural justice and group value theory has,
thus far, focused primarily on formal legal proceedings, with far less
consideration of mediation proceedings. Recently, however, some scholars
have begun to argue for the implementation of procedural justice principle in
John Thibaut, The Relation Between Procedural Justice and Distributive Justice, 65 VA.
L. REv. 1401 (1979) (asserting that application of the procedural justice principles can,
inter alia, impact parties' sense of the fairness of the process, not only from a procedural
perspective but also from an outcome perspective, as well as enhance their satisfaction
with the proceedings, acceptance of the outcome, and the extent of their commitment to
that outcome); T.R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule ofLaw,
30 CRIME & JUST. 283 (2003) (noting that the application of the principles of procedural
justice can have ramifications for the legitimacy of the social institution in which the
dispute resolution is conducted-i.e., the way in which these principles are applied can
influence the individual's attitude towards the community and its sources of authority).
See also Welsh, supra note 2, at 817-20.
53 See, e.g., THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 52. On the basis of this approach, Lind
& Tyler developed at a later stage the social exchange approach; see LIND & TYLER,
supra note 52, at 222-30; see also Welsh, supra note 2, at 826.
54 See LIND & TYLER, supra note 52, at 230-40; Welsh, supra note 2, at 827.
55 See LIND & TYLER, supra note 52; Holly A. Schroth & Priti P. Shah, Procedures:
Do We Really Want to Know Them? An Examination of the Effects of Procedural Justice
on Self Esteem, 85 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 462 (2000) (discussing the effects of procedural
justice on state-dependent self-esteem).
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mediation.56 The justification for this rests on an analogy between the
parties' subjective experience in the framework of mediation and parties'
experience in court. Whereas the mediator is not authorized to decide the
dispute, he nonetheless has a unique legal role and authority.57 It is not
surprising, therefore, that in many cases, the mediating parties and even
lawyers view the mediator as an agent of the court and as performing a
public function. 58 Thus, using group value theory, a mediator's violation of a
procedural justice principle could impair parties' sense of belonging to the
general community.59 Going from theory to practice, Welsh, a prominent
researcher in this area, advocates the application of procedural justice
principles to mediation60 and maintains that mediators should treat parties
with particular dignity and respect while fostering dialogue between them.
The mediator must also encourage the active participation of the parties
themselves-not only of their lawyers-and ensure that they have adequate
opportunity to tell their stories in the manner that best suits them, to argue
their claims, and to present evidence. In addition, Welsh asserts that the
mediator must make informed use of the option to conduct separate meetings
(caucuses) with the parties, in order to ensure that their use does not conflict
with the application of procedural justice principles in the mediation. 61
56 See, e.g., Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice in
Negotiation: Procedural Fairness, Outcome Acceptance, and Integrative Potential, 33
LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 473 (2008) (employing two correlational studies to test the
hypothesis that procedural justice, or fairness of process, plays a role in acceptance of
agreements reached through bilateral negotiation); Dean G. Pruitt et al., Long-Term
Success in Mediation, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 313 (1993) (applying procedural justice
theory to mediation and finding that parties who perceived their mediation as fair were
more likely to honor their agreement).
5 See infra Part III.A.2.
58 See, e.g., Wayne D. Brazil, Hosting Mediation as a Representative of the System
of Civil Justice, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 227, 234 (2007) ("This level of
involvement by the court in the provision of mediation and other ADR services increases
the likelihood that parties who participate in court-sponsored mediations will view the
mediator as an agent and representative of the court."). It should be noted that the legal
treatment of the mediator's role can have constitutive significance for the social
perception of that role. See Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REv.
57 (1984) (the law as constitutive of and structuring parties' perceptions).
59 See, e.g., Welsh, supra note 2, at 831.
60 See Welsh, supra note 2, at 838.
61 See Welsh, supra note 2, at 851; see also Hea Jin Koh, "Yet I Shall Temper So
Justice with Mercy": Procedural Justice in Mediation and Litigation, 28 LAW &
PSYCHOL. REv. 169 (2004) (comparing how mediation and litigation provide procedural
justice to disputing parties).
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Thus far we argue for legalizing the implementation of procedural justice
principles in mediation, focusing on the parties' experience of mediation as a
public-support process and their perception of the mediator as a
representative of the community. We will now add another dimension to our
communitarian conception of mediation by arguing that it encompasses
substantive public components, not only from the psychological-subjective
perspective, but also under objective public-policy analysis.
2. The Public Policy Perspective: Society's Moral Responsibility
for Mediation
Mediation lies somewhere between direct negotiations among parties and
traditional legal proceedings that culminate in a judicial decision. On the one
hand, in mediation, similar to the classic contract context, and in contrast to
public legal proceedings, the parties, not the court, are the final
decisionmakers. On the other hand, there is a clear and significant difference
between mediation and regular private contracting. A regular contract is
made between the parties without the intervention of an appointed third
party;62 in mediation, by definition, an external representative is involved,
who, although he has no authority to decide the dispute, can nonetheless be
regarded, in many respects, as serving a public function. 63 To begin with, the
court sends the litigating parties to mediation, oftentimes compelling them to
participate." Secondly, in many instances, the mediator is in fact appointed
62 There are many theoretical approaches as to the proper conduct of mediators. See
discussion infra Part IV.A.; see also Robert A. Baruch Bush, What Do We Need a
Mediator For?: Mediation's "Value-Added" for Negotiators, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP.
RESOL. 1, 27 (1996) (arguing that mediation improves the negotiation process by
facilitating "an increased level of party participation in and control over decisions made
in the process.").
63 We are not referring, of course, to those situations in which the judge serves as
mediator. But see Shelby A. Linton Keddie, Outsourcing Justice: A Judge's
Responsibility When Sending Parties to Mediation, 25 PENN ST. INT'L L. REv. 717, 735
(2007) ("In order to determine what a judge's responsibility should be when outsourcing
justice to mediators or other third party neutrals, the ABA could learn from the Bangalore
Principles and do something as simple as expand the definition of 'judge' to include
anyone who exercises judicial power. At first glance, this would certainly appear to apply
to both court-appointed mediators and arbitrators.").
6 See, e.g., Streeter-Schaefer, supra note 23 (reviewing the legislation dealing with
mandatory mediation). At times, the legal system pays the mediator's fee. See Brazil,
supra note 21. This issue, in itself, could have a significant impact on the identification of
the mediator as filling a public role. See Mark H. Moore, Symposium: Public Values in an
Era of Privatization: Introduction, 116 HARv. L. REv. 1212, 1213 (2003) (describing
public funding as a restriction on privatization).
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by the court and in accordance with criteria set by law.65 Thirdly, since
mediator certification is regulated by the law, even when the parties turn to a
certified mediator of their own initiative, they are doing so on the basis of
recognition granted to that mediator by the law.66 Fourthly, the legislature
itself has extended special protection to the mediation process and the
mediator in granting legal immunity to mediators that exceeds the immunity
usually applicable in legal negotiations.67 Finally, the courts conceive of and
describe the mediator as filling a public role and as functioning as the "long
arm" of the court. 68 The latter point is of legal and practical significance. For
example, mediators are sometimes authorized and even required to report to
the court regarding the parties' attendance or absence from the mediation
sessions69 and, at times, are also authorized to report to the court on the
parties' conduct during the proceedings. 70 in some jurisdictions, the
65 See, e.g., Robert K. Wise, Mediation in Texas: Can the Judge Really Make Me Do
That?, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 849, 852 (2006) (noting in Texas, the mediator is usually an
attorney or retired judge selected either by the court or by the parties with the court's
approval).
66 But see Frank E.A. Sander & Lukasz Rozdeiczer, Matching Cases and Dispute
Resolution Procedures: Detailed Analysis Leading to a Mediation-Centered Approach,
11 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2006) (distinguishing between different types of
mediation procedures, including between court-related [public] mediation and out-of-
court [private] mediation); see also Reuben, supra note 2 (applying the state action theory
only in court-ordered mediation proceedings, in which the mediator can be considered as
serving a public function and as a representative of the state). It should be noted that the
federal Uniform Mediation Act does not distinguish between a mediation procedure that
stems from a court order and mediation initiated with the parties' consent.
67 See generally Scott H. Hughes, Mediator Immunity: The Misguided and
Inequitable Shifting ofRisk, 83 OR. L. REv. 107 (2004) (reviewing the legislation on this
matter).
68 See, e.g., Vitakis-Valchine v. Valchine, 793 So.2d 1094, 1099 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2001) ("During a court-ordered mediation, the mediator is no ordinary third party, but is,
for all intent and purposes, an agent of the court carrying out an official court-ordered
function. We hold that the court may invoke its inherent power to maintain the integrity
of the judicial system and its processes by invalidating a court-ordered mediation
settlement agreement obtained through violation and abuse of the judicially-prescribed
mediation procedures."); see also Wagshal v. Foster, 28 F.3d 1249, 1254 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (holding that a mediator in the superior court's alternative dispute resolution
[ADR] system performed judicial functions); Brazil, supra note 58, at 235 ("The court's
staff mediators are very likely to be viewed as agents and representatives of our court,
and the court imposes duties on them that are rooted in that understanding.").
69 See, e.g., FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.730(a); see also UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT § 7(b)
(2003).
70 See, e.g., DEL. CT. CH. R. 174. 1(c)(1) (mediators may make recommendations
regarding sanctions for bad-faith participation in mediation); E.D. Mo. L. R. 6.04(A)
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mediator's presence means that the mediation settlement can be submitted
for court approval and thereby gain the force of a court order.71 Furthermore,
courts are reluctant to accept ex-post arguments regarding flaws in the
formation of the post-mediation contract, as they trust the mediators to
prevent such flaws. 72 Thus, the mediator's presence and involvement in the
dispute resolution process are of public significance. 73 This distinguishes
mediation from private negotiations and transforms it into negotiations
conducted under the aegis of the court or the state. 74
It is important to stress at this juncture that, contrary to the prevailing
view, even conventional contract law has a latent public aspect to it,
manifested in the fact that the private contract is enforced by the public
state.75 From this perspective, contract law dictates the circumstances in
which the state's autonomous authority will be exercised over the parties'
relationship. This public dimension is manifested in, amongst other things,
the state's decisions regarding the interpretation of contracts, the duty of
(creating an exception to confidentiality rule to permit mediators to file reports indicating
compliance with good-faith requirements); NEv. REV. STAT. §40.680(6) (2002)
(mediators' report of bad faith is admissible in evidence). It should be noted that, in many
cases, such reporting by the mediator is prohibited. See, e.g., CAL. EvID. CODE § 1121,
Law Revision Comm'n cmt. (West 2002) ("[A] mediator should not be able to influence
the result of a mediation or adjudication by reporting or threatening to report to the
decision maker on the merits of the dispute or reasons why mediation failed to resolve
it.").
71 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §5-514 (2001) (providing that a mediated settlement
agreement can become a court order).
72 See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Equity Fin. Group, No. CIV.
04-1512 (RBK), 2007 WL 2139399 (D. N.J. July 23, 2007) (ruling that mediator's
recommendation on the final settlement offer is an attestation to its reasonableness).
7 See, e.g., Supreme Court Approves Ethical Guidelines for Mediators, 68 TEX. B.J.
856, 856 (2005) ("[C]ounsel representing parties in the mediation of a pending case
remain officers of the court in the same manner as if appearing in court . .. Counsel shall
cooperate with the court and the mediator in the initiation and conduct of the
mediation.").
74 See Keddie, supra note 63 (holding the court responsible for mediator conduct
and for the mediation proceedings in accordance with the provisions of the Model Code
of Judicial Conduct); see also Leon E. Trakman, Commentary, Appropriate Conflict
Management, 2001 Wis. L. REv. 919, 929 (2001) ("If the justice system is to leave
institutions of conflict management to the 'private' sector, it ought not to ignore its
responsibility to regulate that sector.").
75 See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948) (holding that enforcement of
contract by the courts would constitute state action); Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of
Contract, 46 HARV. L. REv. 553, 585-86 (1933) (stressing that contract law has a public
law dimension, involving public policy choices, because it requires exercising the
sovereign power of the state).
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disclosure set by the state, and public welfare rules that circumscribe the
boundaries of contract enforcement. 76 The public aspect inherent to every
contract intensifies in the context of mediation, where the negotiations
themselves are conducted and monitored by a public representative.
Mediation's underlying public dimension can also be understood through
relational contract theory."7 This theory shows that there are a variety of
relationships in which there is a particular need for the state to intervene and
regulate the conduct of the parties in a more public way than in the case of
other relationships.78 These relationships are often typified by the fact that
what transpires during and after the relations significantly impacts how the
individual perceives himself as part of the community. Accordingly, the state
should monitor and be involved, in significant way, in what occurs in the
framework of such relationships. 79 As noted,80 the presence of the
mediator-the state's representative-at the mediation constitutes just such a
relationship wherein the mediation framework influences how the parties
perceive themselves as part of the general community. Applying relational
contract theory to the mediation context,81 therefore, supports our argument
in favor of special communitarian regulation of mediation.
76 See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Emergence of Dynamic Contract Law, 88 CAL.
L. REv. 1743 (2000) (arguing for public aspects within modem contract law).
77 See generally Symposium, Law, Private Governance and Continuing
Relationships, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 461 (1985); Symposium, Law, Relational Contract
Theory, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 737 (2000); Panel Discussion, Relational Contracting in a
Digital Age, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REv. 675 (2005).
78 See generally James W. Fox Jr., Relational Contract Theory and Democratic
Citizenship, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1 (2003) (discussing the normative aspects of
relational contract theory).
79 In this context, labor relations are one of the most typical examples of
relationships in which it is important that the state intervene and regulate what happens in
their framework in a more communitarian and pervasive way than prevailing contract
law. See id at 44-53, (arguing that the field of labor offers a key context for exploring
how a democratic citizenship theory can advance relational contract theory); see also
Robert C. Bird, Employment as a Relational Contract, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 149,
158 (2005) ("Contract law, although not wholly incompatible with employment, does not
fully account for the broad range of relational interests and contexts present in
employment relationships.").
80 See infra Part M.A.
81 Many scholars have already asserted that insofar as contract disputes are
concerned, their resolution by way of mediation fits well with the application of relational
contract theory. See, e.g., Schmitz, supra note 6, at 62 (noting that Arbitration and ADR
agreements may foster "relational" exchanges under Ian MacNeil's relational contract
theory); William C. Whitford, Ian MacNeil's Contribution to Contract Scholarship, 1985
Wis. L. REv. 545, 551 (1985) (arguing that MacNeil's theory favors greater reliance on
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B. The Communitarian View and the Regulation of the Post-Mediation
Contract
Above, we presented the social psychology and public-policy
justifications for a communitarian approach to mediation and explained
current trends in mediation law through the prism of this approach. However,
as already noted,82 prevailing law focuses almost solely on the mediator-
parties relationship and detaches the latter from the parties' internal
relationship. At first glance, it seems that this separation between the two
levels of relations can be justified even under a communitarian theory of
mediation. First, from the social psychology perspective, until recently,
procedural justice and group value theories focused primarily on court
litigation. Hence, they assumed that the relationship between litigators and
state representative-i.e., the judge-and not the internal relationship
between the litigators themselves-is the determinative factor in litigators'
self-respect and sense of belonging to the community.83 If we apply this
premise to the context of mediation regulation,84 it seems that the parties'
sense of belonging to the community can be sufficiently ensured by
regulation solely of the mediator-parties relationship based on procedural
justice principles. In contrast, since the internal relations between the parties
are devoid of any such public-social ramifications, it suffices to regulate this
sphere through conventional contract law. Second, from a public policy
perspective, it is possible to argue that the state has no responsibility for the
resulting contract because the mediator, as the state's representative in the
mediation, is involved in conducting the negotiations, but not in determining
their outcome.
As opposed to these modes of thought, we present below a novel
approach that holds the mediator's presence at the mediation lends a
communitarian dimension to the process in its entirety, including the internal
relationship between mediating parties. We argue that this communitarian
dimension justifies, in turn, special regulation of the parties' relationship and,
in particular, the post-mediation contract. To ground this approach, we will
revisit the social psychological and public policy foundations of our
procedures oriented towards mediation and less emphasis on adversary processes looking
towards adjudication).
82 See supra Part H.B.
83 See Tom R. Tyler & E. Allen Lind, A Relational Model ofAuthority in Groups,
25 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PsYcHoL. 115 (1992) (suggesting that it is the
relationship with the person implementing the dispute resolution procedure [the third
party] that creates the feelings about self-identity and group status).
84 For emphasis of this matter, see Welsh, supra note 2.
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communitarian theory of mediation and demonstrate that they cannot be
realized solely in the sphere of the mediator-parties relationship. We
therefore call for a collapsing of the existing dichotomies and the adoption of
a comprehensive communitarian approach to mediation law.
1. The Social-Psychology Perspective and the Post-Mediation
Contract
a. The Impact of Mediator Violations ofProcedural Justice
on the Post-Mediation Contract
The procedural justice approach stresses the great significance of fairness
(e.g., voice, equal treatment, and respect) in the dispute resolution process.
Group value theory reveals that implementing procedural justice principles
sends a message to the parties regarding their social situation and status in
the community. These theories support the emerging regulation of the
mediator-parties relationship, to guarantee the implementation of procedural
justice principles and prevent the serious psychological effects of violations
of these principles. Nevertheless, as long as the remedy for such violations
amounts only to administrative procedures against the mediator, 85 while the
flawed mediation continues to proceed and eventually results in a valid and
enforceable contract, the severe psychological consequences that group-value
theory predicts will persist. Hence, we believe that at least in cases of gross
violation of procedural justice principles by a mediator, the mediation
proceeding in its entirety should be invalidated, including its "poisonous
fruit," the post-mediation contract. 86
b. Procedural Justice Violations by the Mediating Parties
Updated research examining procedural justice and mediation added
further important layers to group value theory. This field of research, known
as interactional justice theory,87 found that parties' satisfaction, self-esteem,
and sense of belonging are influenced not only by their direct interaction
85 See Young, supra note 5 (describing sanctions used against mediators for
violations of mediation rules).
86 See discussion infra Part IV.
87 See Robert J. Bies & Joseph S. Moag, Interactional Justice: Communication
Criteria of Fairness, in RESEARCH ON NEGOTIATION IN ORGANIZATIONS 43, 44-45 (Roy
J. Lewicki et al. eds., 1986) (developing interactional justice, which involves the personal
exchanges between people).
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with the mediator but also, and sometimes even more so, by their reciprocal
interaction and the general atmosphere prevailing during the mediation.88 In
other words, even if it is one of the parties, and not the mediator, who
behaves inappropriately in violation of procedural justice requirements
(voice, respect, trust, etc.), the injured party experiences the mediation as a
failure in its entirety, accompanied by all adverse psychological effects
derived from this.
The negative outcome of a party's improper conduct during mediation
would seem to result also in direct settlement negotiations between the
parties.89 Upon closer scrutiny, however, a substantive difference emerges
between mediation and direct negotiations in this respect. In the context of
mediation, the presence of the mediator, the state's representative, infuses the
negotiations with a public dimension so that everything that transpires in the
framework of the negotiations has a meaningful impact on how the
participating individual regards himself or herself as a respected, equal
member of the community and as an equal resident of the democratic state. 90
Therefore, even when it is one of the mediating parties who violate
procedural justice principles, the mere fact that it transpired during the
mediation and that the mediator did not prevent it adds a communitarian
dimension to the private reciprocal relationship between the parties. It is in
light of these communitarian aspects of the relationship between the
mediating parties that we oppose the current pure private-contractual
regulation of their relationship. We assert that a special contract law regime
that balances between the communitarian and private aspects of the parties'
88 See Nabatchi & Bingham, supra note 14 (finding that disputants' satisfaction with
mediation in the U.S. Postal Service Redress program was best explained by their
perceptions of their interactions with one another); Tina Nabatchi, Lisa Blomgren
Bingham & David H. Good, Organizational Justice and Workplace Mediation: A Six-
Factor Model, 18 INT'L J. CONFLICT MGMT. 148 (2007) (discussing the importance of
interactional justice in mediation).
89 Hollander-Blumoff & Tyler, supra note 56 (analyzing the effect of procedural
justice principles on regular negotiations); see also Dan Markovits, Contract and
Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 1417 (2004) (understanding the morality of contracts by
reference to a relation of community that arises among the persons who enter into
contracts, whereby each participant respects the other participants by granting them a
form of authority over her future conduct).
90 Psychological studies show that the involvement of a third party in any
relationship (in our case, the mediator's involvement in the mediation negotiations
between the mediating parties) can lead to a redefinition of the relationship and the
implications of the parties' performances in the framework of that relationship. See, e.g.,
Wayne Regina, Bowen Systems Theory and Mediation, 18 MEDIATION Q. 181 (2000)
(applying Bowen's triangle theory to mediation).
688
[Vol. 25:3 2010]
A COMMUNITARIAN THEORY OF POST-MEDIATION CONTRACTS
relationship should govern the post-mediation contract. In Part IV below, we
present our proposed application of such a legal regime.
c. Procedural Justice and Fairness of the Mediation
Outcome
Despite the fact that group value theory originated in the field of
procedural justice,91 it is important to recognize that an unfair outcome
resulting from a public or semipublic proceeding impacts also the way in
which the individual regards himself as part of the community and as a
legitimate resident of the democratic state, with all that this entails.92
Specifically in the context of mediation, new research found that a fair
outcome, in addition to, and in conjunction with procedural justice principles,
is vital for party satisfaction. 93 Communitarian regulation of mediation thus
should go beyond the procedural aspects of mediation and also oversee the
substantive fairness of the post-mediation contract.94
2. The Public Policy Perspective: State Responsibility for the Post-
Mediation Contract
From the public policy perspective as well, application of procedural
principles should not be limited to the mediating parties' relationship.
a. Public Responsibility for Flaws in the Mediator's
Performance
In many instances, the mediator's inadequate performance is likely to
impact the relations between the parties themselves as well as the post-
mediation contract. For example, a mediator who misleads one of the parties
as to the hypothetical legal outcome of the case pushes him too aggressively
towards settlement, or conducts the mediation session in an unbalanced
91 See infra Part II.A.1.
92 See LIND & TYLER, supra note 52, at 230-31; see also E. Patrick McDermott &
Danny Ervin, The Influence ofProcedural and Distributive Variables on Settlement Rates
in Employment Discrimination Mediation, 2005 J. DISP. RESOL. 45, 48 (claiming that
parties must have control over the outcome of mediation).
93 Nancy A. Welsh, Stepping Back Through the Looking Glass: Real Conversations
with Real Disputants About Institutionalized Mediation and Its Value, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON
Disp. RESOL. 573, 672 (2004) (noting that disputants want procedural justice and
resolution).
94 For legal mechanism of substantive fairness review see infra notes 156-57.
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manner might eventually lead the parties into an unjust contract. Yet,
although regular contract law includes such doctrines as duress, 95 mistake,96
and misrepresentation, 97 it lacks an appropriate remedy when the mediator,
who is not a party to the post-mediation contract, misleads or coerces the
parties to the contract. 98 Needless to say, regular contract law also offers no
remedy for other flaws in mediator conduct, such as mediator partiality or
failure to ensure that the parties' voices are heard. In such circumstances,
regulating only the mediator-parties relationship without supplementary
regulation of the parties' interrelationship and the post-mediation contract in
a manner that deviates from conventional contract law will undermine the
moral responsibility of the state and courts for what transpires in mediation.
b. Public Responsibility for Parties' Conduct During
Mediation
We have described the mediator as a representative of the public and
community and therefore, explained the community's moral responsibility
for the mediator's performance and the need to regulate it. But this public
responsibility relates to all that transpires during mediation, not only to the
conduct of the state's representative in the process. In court litigation,
procedural law regulates the parties' conduct in the sphere of their internal
relations, for example, by setting broad disclosure duties,99 and does not
regulate only the judge's conduct towards the parties. In mediation as well,
the state's moral responsibility for what transpires during the process should
extend to the parties' internal relations and the post-mediation contract. From
a moral perspective, when the individual is injured in a context in which
there is public responsibility towards him, it is hard to justify a distinction
between injury caused by the public's representative and injury caused by
another individual, without the former, who is in charge of the process,
preventing or at least remedying that injury.
Thus, the public-policy analysis demonstrates that it is not sufficient to
regulate only the mediator-parties relationship, but rather, there is a need for
special regulation of the internal relationship between the parties and of the
post-mediation contract.
95 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 174-75 (1981).
96 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152(1).
9 7 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 162-64.
8 See supra notes 8-10 and Part II.B.
99 See Oscar G. Chase, American "Exceptionalism" and Comparative Procedure, 50
AM. J. COMP. L. 277 (2002) (discussing the pretrial discovery rules in America and
abroad).
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IV. THE COMMUNITARIAN APPROACH IN PRACTICE
A. From Partial Regulation of Mediators to Comprehensive
Regulation of Mediation
Thus far, we have proposed a communitarian theory of mediation
grounded on social-psychological and public policy approaches. Following
our communitarian theory, the discussion has underscored the need for
special regulation of mediation focusing specifically on the post-mediation
contract. In this Part, we proceed to lay down the foundations for such
communitarian regulation and expand on the practical legal ramifications that
arise from this proposed regime. Communitarian regulation begins with the
mediator. In contrast with the private conception of mediation, our theory
emphasizes the public role of mediators as community representatives. 100
Hence, we advocate a regulatory system that creates barriers to entry into the
mediation field,10' as well as regulation of mediator conduct during the
mediation process. Thus, we recommend to enact procedural justice
principles such as voice, impartiality, neutrality, dignity, and respect into
enforceable legal norms in the mediation context. 102 Today, some of these
principles exist as voluntary norms but not as governmental regulation.103
And even where governmental regulation does exist, it is often loosely
enforced.104 Our theory would entail the elaboration of the existing
regulation of mediator conduct and to bolster its enforceability.
100 This theory is at least true in court-related mediation. See supra note 66.
101 See Young, supra note 5 (reviewing the regulation of mediators and discussing
proposals for certifying mediators); see also Moffitt, supra note 36 (doubting the
possibility of the state enacting barriers to entry into the field and discussing proposed
alternatives).
102 Our approach converges on this point with Welsh. See Welsh supra note 2. Yet,
in light of our communitarian approach, we recommend here more comprehensive and
enforceable legal norms.
103 See, e.g., Young, supra note 5, at 736 n.48 ("Only 17 states or states supreme
courts currently require certain mediators to comply with mandatory ethics standards.");
see also Moffitt, supra note 36 (emphasizing that the Model Standards are not
governmental regulations).
104 See Young, supra note 5, at 775 ("As a sanction, regulators are more likely to
require a mediator to take additional training or to learn from experienced mediators by
observing them, working under their supervision, or co-mediating with them."); see also
Michael Moffitt, Suing Mediators, 83 B.U. L. REv. 147, 153-54 (2003) (stating that it is
extraordinarily difficult to sue a mediator successfully for her mediation conduct).
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Our practical recommendations for the appropriate regulation of
mediator conduct in many aspects converge with other approaches. 05 Yet
while other models for regulating mediator conduct focus solely on the
mediator-parties relations, our theoretical approach shows that this is not
sufficient. Under our communitarian regime, a violation by the mediator of
his duties would impact, in certain circumstances, the validity of the post-
mediation contract. Moreover, our communitarian theory demonstrates the
need for the regulation of a post-mediation contract which encompasses the
interrelation between parties involved in mediation. Section B below lays out
the cornerstone for a contract-law regime based on such considerations.
Section C addresses and rejects standard objections to judicial review, and
then suggests ways to adapt existing mediation rules (specifically, those
related to mediation confidentiality) to our proposed regulation model.
B. Communitarian Regulation of the Post-Mediation Contract
A communitarian regulation regime for the post-mediation contract
would integrate communitarian application of existing contract law doctrines
with developing special contractual doctrines. This communitarian theory of
mediation has ramifications for the regulation of every stage of the
mediation: the preliminary stages, the mediation proceedings, the procedure
for court approval of the post-mediation contract, and any later litigation over
the agreement. It also shatters the dichotomy between the mediator-parties'
relations and the parties' interrelations, and thus, creating a link between
mediator conduct and the post-mediation contract. In this Part, we will
elaborate on some of these ramifications.
1. A Duty ofDisclosure at the Preliminary Stages ofMediation
In the regular contract setting, the level of the duty of disclosure
expresses society's moral expectations of the contractual partners during the
course of negotiations. Classic contract law theory focuses on party rivalries
and sets a low disclosure requirement. Modern contract law, in contrast,
emphasizes also the solidarity and cooperation between the parties and is
more open to raising the level of disclosure required. 0 6 Yet even modern
contract law does not prescribe a general disclosure duty, nor does it impose
105 See, e.g., Reuben, supra note 2; Welsh, supra note 2; Young, supra note 5.
106 See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, Disclosure in Contract Law, 91 CAL. L. REv.
1645 (2003) (developing a basic principle that should govern disclosure in contract law).
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a sweeping altruistic burden on the negotiating parties to disclose every piece
of information to the other side.10 7
In the context of mediation, the influence of the conventional private
approach seems to have led to a narrow application of the disclosure duty in
the proceedings.108 However, our communitarian conception of mediation
entails a quite different outcome. From the social-psychological perspective,
integrating group value and interactional justice theories, our model
emphasizes the importance of interpersonal relations and communication
between the mediating parties,109 pointing specifically to truthfulness, mutual
respect, 110 and informed consent.' Our public policy analysis shows that
due to the presence of the mediator as a community representative and due to
the legal promotion of mediation, deception and violations of trust cause far
more damage than they would in private negotiation.112 Hence, unlike the
prevailing trends within current law, we advocate imposing a heightened
duty of disclosure on the mediating parties, and when this duty is violated,
the post-mediation contract should be voidable. 113
Beyond the ex post invalidation of the post-mediation contract in cases of
disclosure violations, we suggest also imposing a special ex ante disclosure
requirement. Under this requirement, which would be similar to disclosure
duties in court litigation, the mediator will be authorized to require that the
parties submit certain items of information that are central to the substantive
points of the dispute.114 A party's failure to provide these items would be
107 See Nicola W. Palmieri, Good Faith Disclosures Required During
Precontractual Negotiations, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 70 (1993) (stressing the disclosure
duty as part of the duty of good faith in contractual negotiations).
108 See, e.g., Wheatcraft v. Wheatcraft, 825 N.E.2d 23 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)
(validating post-mediation contract despite husband's alleged fraudulent
misrepresentation of valuation of business).
109 See supra Part III.B.1.
110 See Bies & Moag, supra note 87.
111 See Love & Cooley, supra note 38; Nolan-Haley, supra note 38.
112 See supra Part III.B.2.
113 See, e.g., Boyd v. Boyd, 67 S.W.3d 398 (Tex. App. 2002) (ruling that a
mediation divorce settlement agreement is unenforceable when one spouse intentionally
withholds information about community property assets).
114 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 39-A §313 ("The mediator may require that the
parties appear and submit relevant information"); John Lande, Dispute System Design
Methods to Promote Good-Faith Participation in Court-Connected Mediation Programs,
50 UCLA L. REV. 69, 129-30 (2002) (proposing detailed list of documents that should be
exchanged by the parties before mediation); Leonard L. Riskin & Nancy A. Welsh, Is
That All There Is? "The Problem" in Court-Oriented Mediation, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV.
863 (2008) (suggesting that courts may require mediators to ask some or all of the
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considered bad-faith participation and would entitle the other party to the
appropriate legal remedy.115 From an incentive point of view, as long as such
disclosure requirements would not exceed the disclosure duty in court, it
would not, in our opinion, undermine willingness to participate in mediation.
On the contrary, it would deepen the trust in the procedure and increase
willingness to participate. Moreover, it would reduce the occurrence of
situations in which parties come to the mediation with the objective of
gleaning information from their adversary, with no intention of disclosing
any information of their own, or cooperating.
2. Good Faith Conduct in the Mediation Proceeding
Although American law imposes an explicit duty of good faith in
contract performance, 116 it is not at all clear whether there is also an implied
pre-contractual duty to negotiate in good faith.1 7 In the context of mediation,
a communitarian model emphasizes both the psychological effect of unfair
negotiations and the fact that public responsibility for procedural justice
relates to all that transpires during the mediation process, not just mediator
conduct. Thus, while there is significant dispute within the legal scholarship
as to whether parties to mediation should bear such a duty of good faith, our
theory strongly supports its imposition.18
mapping and setting questions in pre-mediation conversations or during mediation
sessions).
115 See infra Part IV.B.2.
116 See U.C.C. § 1-203 (1994) ("Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an
obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981); Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith-Its
Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810 (1982) (discussing the
application of the good faith duty in court).
117 See Eisenberg, supra note 76 (arguing that modem contract law is familiar with
the general duty to behave in good faith during negotiations).
118 The literature is filled with a great many responses and approaches to the
question of whether a duty of good faith should be imposed on parties to mediation. See
generally Roger L. Carter, Oh, Ye of Little [Good] Faith: Questions, Concerns and
Commentary on Efforts to Regulate Participant Conduct in Mediations, 2002 J. DisP.
RESOL. 367 (discussing the prospect of requiring "good-faith" participation in mediation
and suggesting normative recommendations); Carol L. Izumi & Homer C. LaRue,
Prohibiting "Good Faith" Reports Under the Uniform Mediation Act: Keeping the
Adjudication Camel Out of the Mediation Tent, 2003 J. DiSP. RESOL. 67 (stating
arguments against good-faith participation requirements in mandatory mediation);
Kimberlee K. Kovach, Good Faith in Mediation-Requested, Recommended, or
Required? A New Ethic, 38 S. TEX. L. REv. 575 (1997) (arguing for a detailed good faith
standard); Lande, supra note 114 (suggesting procedural requirements to assure a fair
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A partial adaptation of this application of our theory already exists in
current law, as many states impose a duty of good faith in mediation,l19 but
in limited form, applying only to preliminary procedural requirements that
arise prior to the substantive negotiations. 120 Accordingly, the courts have
deemed parties to have acted in bad faith when they failed to appear at the
mediation proceedings,121 sent a representative who lacked full settlement
authority,122 or failed to produce the requested position paper detailing their
factual and legal versions and stances regarding the dispute or documents
related to the dispute.123 Beyond these preliminary procedural applications of
the good faith duty, the courts have almost completely refrained from setting
process and leaving good faith duty as a last resort); Maureen A. Weston, Checks on
Participant Conduct in Compulsory ADR: Reconciling the Tension in the Need for Good-
Faith Participation, Autonomy, and Confidentiality, 76 IND. L.J. 591 (2001) (proposing a
standard for a good-faith participation requirement in private ADR, while balancing the
competing policy concerns attending such an obligation).
119 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-22-311(3) (West 2001); MINN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 115B.414(3)-(4), 583.26(5)(c)(1), 583.27 (West 2001); Lande, supra note 114,
at 78 (reviewing statutes, court rules, mediation referral orders, and common law that
establish good-faith requirements in mediation).
120 See, e.g., Nick v. Morgan's Foods, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1060-61 (E.D. Mo.
2000) (finding a good faith requirement in ADR based on Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and the court's inherent authority to preserve the integrity of the judicial
proceedings). There are those who maintain that the court has the authority to order the
parties to behave in this manner without any need to resort to the general standard of
good faith. It also should be noted that failure to appear at the mediation proceedings has
been recognized as bad faith even when the mediation was initiated by the parties and not
court-ordered. See Pueblo of San Ildefonso v. Ridlon, 90 F.3d 423 (10th Cir. 1996).
121 See, e.g., Segui v. Margrill, 844 So. 2d 820, 820 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)
(ruling that a party's obligation to obey a court order to attend mediation is not fulfilled
by the presence of counsel at the mediation with full authority to settle).
122 There is a decided lack of consensus on this subject amongst the courts.
Compare Nick, 99 F. Supp. at 1062 (sending a representative lacking full settlement
authority constitutes bad faith); with In re Acceptance Ins. Co., 33 S.W.3d 443, 452 (Tex.
App. 2000) (rejecting the claim of bad faith in a similar situation). See also Ins. Co. of
North America v. Gains, 765 So. 2d 139, 139 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (despite the fact
that a representative with full settlement authority had not been sent, no sanction was
imposed since the court that had referred the parties to mediation had not given an
explicit order for the participation of such an authorized representative).
123 See, e.g., Nick, 99 F. Supp. at 1061; see also E.D. WASH. LOC. R.
16.2(c)(2)(b)(3)(C) (requiring parties to provide a pre-mediation memo); Francis v.
Women's Obstetrics & Gynecology Group, 144 F.R.D. 646, 647 (W.D.N.Y. 1992)
(asserting that the requirement to be prepared to participate at pretrial conferences derives
from the provision in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(f)); supra Part IV.B.1
(discussing the disclosure requirement).
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any substantive good faith conduct requirements in mediation,124 thereby
opening the door to exploitation of the process. Our theory and existing law
diverge here. Under our proposed regime, good faith in mediation should
entail not only attending the mediation proceedings, but also party conduct
during the mediation. Thus, in our regime, at least in voluntary mediation,
attending a negotiations session but refusing to conduct negotiations in a
substantive fashion would amount to bad faith conduct.125 Furthermore,
when mediation negotiations have reached an advanced stage, a party's
refusal to fulfill the formal requirements for making the settlement agreement
enforceable could be deemed bad faith participation in mediation in the
concrete circumstances of the case. 126 The need for a substantive good faith
standard was well illustrated by the circumstances of the California case of
Simmons v. Ghaderi.127 There, an oral settlement agreement was reached in
mediation based on negotiations between the parties. As the formal
requirements for validating the agreement were not completely satisfied, the
California Supreme Court refused to enforce the agreement, despite the fact
that it had been recorded in writing by the mediator.128 The circumstances in
124 See Graham v. Baker, 447 N.W.2d 397, 399 (Iowa 1989) ("the parties' mere
appearance at the mediation sessions is sufficient."); see also Stoehr v. Yost, 765 N.E.2d
684, 686-88 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (ruling that usually it is sufficient that the parties attend
the mediating sessions, albeit there could be special circumstances in which parties will
be deemed as acting in bad faith even when they do attend the mediation).
125 In one exceptional case, the court adopted a stricter approach, Tex. Dep't of
Transp. v. Pirtle, 977 S.W.2d 657, 658 (Tex. App. 1998) (demanding substantive
participating in consensual mediation); see also FLA. STAT. § 627.745(d) (requiring all
parties to mediate in good faith).
126 For bad-faith participation outside of the context of mediation see E. Me. Med.
Ctr. v. NLRB, 658 F.2d 1, 10, 13 (1st Cir. 1981) (adopting substantive interpretation of
the good-faith duty in the advanced stages of negotiations). Under our approach, a similar
policy should also be considered in mediation.
127 Simmons v. Ghaderi, 187 P.3d 934 (Cal. 2008).
128 Another well-known and widely discussed example in this context is the
Minnesota law, in effect up until a few years ago, that conditioned the enforcement of
mediation settlement agreements on written form and parties' signature, as well as
explicit indication in the body of the agreement that it is a binding contract and that the
contracting parties have received written counsel regarding the following: (1) the
mediator is under no duty to protect the parties' interests or inform them of their legal
situations; (2) the parties' signature on the settlement agreement will impact and, most
likely, change their legal situations; and (3) the parties have the right to consult with legal
counsel before signing the agreement. MMN. STAT. ANN. § 572.35 (West 1998) (the
statute originated in 1983, when the Minnesota Civil Mediation Act was legislated). In
accordance with this, Minnesota courts refused to enforce mediation contracts that failed
to meet all these formal requirements, even when a contract had been made according to
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Rizk v. Millard,129 a Texas case, were similar, involving an oral arrangement
formulated between the parties towards the end of the mediation proceedings.
The court noted that the mediator had summoned the parties and their
lawyers, and in the presence of all, the parties had orally confirmed their
consent to the arrangement, and a written preliminary draft was even drawn
up. However, although neither of the sides voiced any objection to the
arrangement at that point, the work was not completed, and the mediation
settlement agreement was not signed by the parties. Later on, one of the
parties announced that he was revoking his consent to the agreement and
would neither sign nor honor it. 130 Following the conventional procedural
application of the good faith duty, the court ruled that the late withdrawal
from the negotiations and refusal to sign the agreement did not amount to a
breach of good faith. We certainly support formal requirements for post-
mediation contracts. However, in our view, late withdrawal from
negotiations without relevant justification, 131 alongside other techniques
lawyers employ to drag out the mediation, without any intention of resolving
the dispute through the negotiations,132 violates trust, respect, and dignity
and, as such, should be considered bad faith conduct and entitle the other
regular contract law. Such was the case, for example, in Haghigi v. Russian-Am. Broad
Co., 173 F.3d 1086 (8th Cir. 1999). However, in the wake of Haghigi, the Minnesota law
was amended in 1999 to allow enforcement of mediation settlement agreements even
when they failed to explicitly note the fulfillment of the requirements. 1999 Minn. Sess.
Law. Serv. 190 (West). However, the law still requires proof that the information was
brought to the parties' attention in some other way.
129 Rizk v. Millard, 810 S.W.2d 318 (Tex. App. 1991).
130 Since Texas law at the time applied strict formal requirements as conditions for
enforcing mediation settlement agreements, the court refused to enforce the agreement
without the parties' signatures, as required under the law.
131 Such late withdrawal seems to be quite frequent. See William J. Caplan, "Deal
or No Deal": Prevent Your Mediated Settlement from Being Just Another Round of
Litigation, 51 ORANGE CouNTY LAWY. 35 (2009) (reviewing such situations and
recommending practical conclusions).
132 See Julie Macfarlane, Culture Change? Commercial Litigators and the Ontario
Mandatory Mediation Program, 2002 J. DisP. RESOL. 241, 267 (quoting a Toronto
litigator: "[Ilf . . . I act for the Big Bad Wolf against Little Red Riding Hood and I don't
want this dispute resolved, I want to tie it up as long as I possibly can, and mandatory
mediation is custom made. I can waste more time, I can string it along, I can make sure
this thing never gets resolved because .. . I know the language. I know how to make it
look like I'm heading in that direction. I make it look like I can make all the right noises
in the world, like this is the most wonderful thing to be involved in when I have no
intention of ever resolving this. I have the intention of making this the most expensive,
longest process but is it going to feel good. It's going to feel so nice, we're going to be
here and we're going to talk the talk but we're not going to walk the walk.").
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party to legal remedy. Thus, when one of the parties prevents the fulfillment
of a formal requirement without justification, a remedy for breach of good
faith should be available to the injured party.
Before concluding this section, two important qualifications are called
for. The first relates to the tension between a substantive good faith
requirement and the requirement for confidentiality in mediation.133 We will
discuss this concern below as part of our broader discussion of the
communitarian theory approach to the confidentiality requirement. The
second point of concern is that a substantive good faith duty in mediation
might trigger "satellite litigation." Namely, the parties may come to the
mediation with one dispute and leave with another-regarding what
transpired during the course of the mediation. In light of this risk, we
recommend limiting the substantive review of parties' conduct during
mediation to special circumstances so as to minimize the satellite litigation
effect. A substantive good faith requirement should be applied in those
special circumstances, despite the potential satellite litigation effect, for in
the absence of such a standard, mediation is open to manipulation and
exploitation of power disparities in a way that undermines trust, respect, and
dignity, all necessary elements of the communitarian concept of
mediation.134
133 See generally Maureen A. Weston, Confidentiality's Constitutionality: The
Incursion on Judicial Power to Regulate Party Conduct in Court-Connected Mediation, 8
HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 29 (2003) (arguing that courts should use their reservoir of
judicial authority to sanction misconduct in court-connected ADR programs, even in
situations of statutes prohibiting mediation disclosures). But see Michael Patrick Dickey,
ADR Gone Wild: Is It Time for a Federal Mediation Exclusionary Rule?, 25 OHIo ST. J.
ON DISPuTE RESOL. _ (forthcoming 2010) (calling to increase the confidentiality in
mediation by recognizing a narrow mediation exclusionary rule).
134 It should be noted that despite the apparent clear disadvantage, increased
litigation can also have a significant advantage. One of the arguments against mediation
is that it is an attempt to fight court congestion and is no more than an effort on the part
of the legal system to lighten its caseload. Yet the justification for mediation that arises
from the appropriate regulation of the procedure in fact rests on mediation values and not
on some need to remedy the court's ailments. Indeed, the increase in litigation will in fact
convey an important message that mediation is a desirable product that should be used.
This could significantly reinforce public trust both in mediation and in the courts.
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3. From Mediation to Settlement Agreement: Judicial Review of
the Post-Mediation Contract
Under prevailing contract law, aside from a few concrete contexts, 135 a
contract's validity is not usually conditioned on form requirements,136 and
certainly in most areas of contract law, there is no procedure set for ex ante
judicial approval of agreements. From an ex post perspective, classical
contract law called only for limited state intervention in contracting parties'
relations and dogmatically insisted on enforcing agreements and the sanctity
of the contract.137 Modem contract law,138 however, opened the door to ex
post judicial review of contractual formation by expanding the criteria for
accepting claims of mistake,139 coercion,140 and unconscionability. 141 In the
context of mediation, in certain jurisdictions, special formal requirements
have been set for enforceability of the post-mediation agreement.142
135 See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1999) (writing requirement in arbitration agreements);
U.C.C. § 2-201 (1998) (establishing a writing requirement for sales of goods priced at or
above $500); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 110 (1981) (providing a modem
equivalent of the statute of frauds).
136 See, e.g., Mich. Reg'1 Council of Carpenters v. New Century Bankcorp, 99 Fed.
App'x 15, 21 (6th Cir. 2004) (relying on general contract law to enforce settlement
contract that was not set forth in writing).
137 See, e.g., Larry A. DiMatteo, Equity's Modification of Contract: An Analysis of
the Twentieth Century's Equitable Reformation of Contract Law, 33 NEW ENG. L. REV.
265 (1999) (discussing the equitable reformation of contract law that transpired during
the twentieth century).
138 See id.
139 See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, Mistake in Contract Law, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1573
(2003) (developing the legal rules that should govern mistake in contract law on a
functional basis).
140 See, e.g., Meredith R. Miller, Revisiting Austin v. Loral: A Study in Economic
Duress, Contract Modification and Framing, 2 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 357 (2006)
(discussing economic duress).
141 See Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause,
115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967) (distinguishing between procedural and substantive
arguments regarding unconscionability); see also Shahar Lifshitz, Distress Exploitation
Contracts in the Shadow of No Duty to Rescue, 86 N.C. L. REV. 315, 329-36 (2008)
(describing the doctrine of unconscionability).
142 See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-22-308(1) (West 1997) ("If the parties
involved in a dispute reach a full or partial agreement, the agreement upon request of the
parties shall be reduced to writing and approved by the parties and their attorneys, if any.
If reduced to writing and signed by the parties, the agreement may be presented to the
court by any party or their attorneys, if any, as a stipulation and, if approved by the court,
shall be enforceable as an order of the court."); TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN.
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However, even where such legislated requirements do exist, the courts
sometimes enforce the mediation settlement agreement despite failure to
meet these requirements, on the grounds that, under regular contract law, an
oral contract was made between the parties.143
These particular formal procedural requirements notwithstanding, the
post-mediation contract is enforced according to regular contract law despite
its public nature. Moreover, in contrast with our communitarian approach to
mediation, which supports increased regulation and judicial review of the
mediation contract, the existing regulatory arrangement in many states goes
in the opposite direction, drawing the contractual regime governing the
parties' relations closer to classic contract law and emphasizing the
precedence of freedom of contract in its formal sense. Thus, many courts
adopt the principle of settlement finality as a guiding principle, thereby
setting a barrier for parties to retroactively challenge a mediation settlement
agreement.144 As a result of this policy, the ability to challenge the contract-
making procedure in mediation is currently more limited than was the case
under the prevailing standard in conventional contract law.145 Moreover,
while courts tend to refrain from substantive review of the fairness of post-
mediation contracts,146 mediation settlement agreements are sometimes
submitted to the court. In these cases, the agreements acquire the force and
§154.071(a) (Vernon 2001) ("If the parties reach a settlement and execute a written
agreement disposing of the dispute, the agreement is enforceable in the same manner as
any other written contract."); see also Ellen E. Deason, Enforcing Mediated Settlement
Agreements: Contract Law Collides with Confidentiality, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 33, 51-
56 (2001) (reviewing the writing requirements in mediation laws).
143 See, e.g., Few v. Hammack Enter., Inc., 511 S.E.2d 665, 670-71 (N.C. Ct. App.
1999) (undercutting both evidentiary and writing requirements for mediated agreements
by deciding that these rules did not overturn the state contract rule permitting
enforcement of settlements reached by oral agreement); see also Deason, supra note 142,
at 57-58.
144 See, e.g., Sponga v. Varro, 698 So. 2d 621, 625 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) ("The
finality of it once the parties have set down their agreement in writing is critical.").
145 See, e.g., Tilden Groves Holding Corp. v. Orlando/Orange County Expressway,
816 So. 2d 658 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (demonstrating the decreased level of scrutiny
in the mediation context); Ghahramani v. Guzman, 768 So. 2d 535, 537 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2000) (same).
146 See, e.g., Crupi v. Crupi, 784 So.2d 611, 613 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (rejecting
the claim that mediated divorce settlements should be set aside because of
"unreasonableness" or "unfairness").
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validity of a court decision and are almost completely immune to invalidation
due to flaws in their formation.147
Our communitarian theory, in contrast, leads to a very different legal
regime. First, well-considered and informed consent are necessary for
ensuring procedural justice. Hence, alongside the regular contractual rules,
our theory seeks additional mechanisms aimed at ensuring the parties'
willingness to enter into a binding contract. This is similar to the approach of
those jurisdictions that insist on formal requirements as a condition for the
validity of the post-mediation contract. 148 Unlike the regime in most of these
jurisdictions, however, our model requires a remedy for a party's bad-faith
refusal to meet those requirements.149
Second, our analysis emphasizes that procedural justice principles such
as voice, informed consent, and self-determination are crucial in mediation,
not only in the context of the mediator-parties relationship but also in the
context of the internal relations between the parties. 50 Our analysis further
demonstrates the state's heightened responsibility for the fairness of
mediation process and its outcomes. 151 Violations of procedural justice
principles in mediation often breed claims of duress, mistake, or
unconscionability.152 Thus, rejecting the application of the principle of
147 See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Equity Fin. Group, Civil No.
04-1512 (RBK), 2007 WL 2139399, at *1 (D.N.J. July 23, 2007) (ruling that mediator's
recommendation on the final settlement offer is an attestation to its reasonableness).
148 There are, of course, many other justifications for formal requirements for the
post-mediation contract. See, e.g., Vernon v. Acton, 732 N.E.2d 805 (Ind. 2000) (refusing
to enforce an oral agreement reached during mediation because of court rules of
confidentiality). Another reason for the existence of formal requirements for the post-
mediation contract is that it is regarded as constituting consent between parties that are in
the process of court litigation, i.e., as part of court proceedings. See, e.g., Margo Ahern,
Agreements in Crisis: The Stinging Effects of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 11 on
Settlement Agreements and the Alternative Dispute Resolution Process, 31 TEX. TECH. L.
REV. 87 (2000) (discussing courts' application of the formal contract-making
requirements in procedural contexts to the post-mediation contract).
149 See supra Part IV.B.2.
150 See supra Part III.B. 1.
151 See supra Part III.B.1(c).
152 See, e.g., Patsky v. Suprenant Cable Corp., No. 972527A, 2001 WL 1029642, at
*2 (Mass. Aug. 2, 2001) (discussing claims of duress, with one of the parties asserting
that he felt pressured when the mediator "said she had another commitment at 5 p.m. and
insisted on the settlement decision"); Ghahramani v. Guzman, 768 So. 2d 535, 537 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (stating that a mediated settlement agreement should not be set aside
on grounds of unilateral mistake); Kendrick v. Barker, 15 P.3d 734, 740-42 (Wyo. 2001)
(enforcing personal injury settlement, while rejecting the claim that unforeseen injuries
made the agreement unconscionable).
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settlement finality, our communitarian theory calls for judicial review of the
post-mediation contract, whereby the court's application of the existing
contractual doctrines will exceed its usual intervention in contract settings. 5 3
In certain circumstances, we support substantive review of the fairness of
the post-mediation contract. Substantive review of the fairness of contracts is
recognized today in certain contractual settings, especially those settings that
are characterized by a significant power disparity between parties.154 In light
of the state's moral responsibility for the product of mediations, we believe
that such fairness review is vital also regarding the post-mediation
contract. 155 Objective criteria to measure the unfairness of the contracts, such
as the disproportionate distribution of the gains among the parties, or the gap
between the contractual and regular market terms,1 56 should also be applied
to mediation law. Yet, taking into account the uniqueness of mediation and
its emphasis on creative solutions and future interests,15 7 the post-mediation
settlement should not necessarily reflect the hypothetical court decision in
the particular case. Hence, according to our proposed regime, courts might
validate even settlements in which one of the parties waived his legal
rights-as long as they are convinced that the settlements reflect the
authentic interest of the parties1 58 as opposed to an exploitation of a
significant disparity in power.159 In other words, our proposed regime
153 Cf Nancy Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court-
Connected Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L.
REv. 1 (2001) (rejecting the idea of modifying the presumption against coercion,
because, inter alia, fewer people might be willing to serve as mediators).
154 For the distinction between procedural and substantive arguments see Leff, supra
note 141; see also United States v. Martinez, 151 F.3d 68, 74 (2d Cir. 1998)
("Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include an absence of meaningful
choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are
unreasonably favorable to the other party."); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle
and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REv. 741, 754-63 (1980) (based on the considerations of
efficiency and fairness, classifying distress exploitation as a type of unconscionability).
155 See supra Part III.B.2.
156 See F. H. Buckley, Three Theories of Substantive Fairness, 19 HOFSTRA L. REv.
33, 40-49, 56-59 (1991); James Gordley, Equality in Exchange, 69 CAL. L. REv. 1587,
1631-37 (1981).
157 See generally ROGER FISHER AND WILLIAM L. URY, GETTING To YES:
NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (1981) (describing the differences
between past oriented litigation to future oriented settlements).
158 See Joseph B. Stulberg, Mediation and Justice: What Standards Govern?, 6
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT REsOL. 213 (2005) (discussing fairness standards in mediation).
159 See Lifshitz supra note 141, at 329-32 (describing the pendulum effect between
procedural and substantive review of contracts in general).
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establishes a pendulum effect between procedural and substantive review of
post mediation contracts: when procedural justice in the mediation is
followed, the courts should narrow, albeit not giving up completely, the
fairness review of the content of the settlement.
In contrast with our approach, proponents of settlement finality assert
that strong judicial intervention in mediation settlement agreements will
increase mediation cost and inhibit people from participating in mediation.
However, in our view, the very opposite will be the case, as a more
communitarian regime will make mediation a more protected procedure and
thus promote its use. Moreover, the proposed model would ex-ante
encourage all the participants in the mediation to ensure the proper
administration of the proceedings.
However, although we do not regard settlement finality to be a decisive
consideration, we nonetheless agree that certainty as to the mediation
outcome is, indeed, an important objective. This leads us to our final
recommendation, namely, the implementation of a substantive mechanism
for court approval of the post-mediation contract. Under our proposed
mechanism, mediators will have the option of submitting the post-mediation
contract to the court for approval. The court will then have the authority to
review the application of procedural justice in the mediation as well as the
fairness of the post-mediation contract. 160 Should the court approve the
contract, it could be enforced in a quicker and easier procedure without any
need for further action. In such cases, the finality principle will come into
effect and the ability to make claims against the contract's validity will be
limited to cases in which new evidence comes to light revealing extreme
duress, exploitation, or misrepresentation.
4. Mediator Conduct and the Post-Mediation Contract
Thus far, we have discussed how our communitarian regulation regime
would address independently the mediator-parties relations and the mediating
parties' internal relationship. However, our communitarian theory also
160 See Ellen E. Deason, Procedural Rules for Complementary Systems of Litigation
and Mediation Worldwide, 80 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 553 (2004) (noting that in many
jurisdictions, procedural leniencies are granted to allow the parties to apply to the court
for summary enforcement of post-mediation contract). Yet, in contrast to the existing
procedural leniencies that lead to summary enforcement, we suggest that the judicial
approval procedure include an examination of whether the parties exercised free will and
their understanding of the contract, a retroactive examination of whether the proper
procedures were implemented during the mediation, and even preliminary scrutiny of the
contract's contents.
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collapses the dichotomy separating these two spheres. In this part we
demonstrate how a mediator's violation of procedural justice rules should
impact the validity of the post-mediation contract.
Under prevailing contract law, the recognized grounds for contract
nullification due to flaws in contract formation are usually restricted to flaws
originating in the conduct of the opposing party or his or her
representative. 161 Conventional application of those contractual doctrines to
mediation means that when the mediator's conduct, rather than the opposing
party's conduct, causes flaws in the contract making, the post-mediation
contract will be enforced. It is not surprising, therefore, that post-mediation
agreements are enforced despite claims of mediator misrepresentation1 62 or
mediator coercion entering into the settlement agreement. 163 Our proposed
communitarian regime, in contrast, calls for an expansion of the existing
contractual doctrines and for enabling parties to void the post-mediation
contract also when the flaws in the contract-making derived from the
mediator's conduct.164
Furthermore, regular contract law does not cover all possible violations
of procedural justice principles by the mediator, such as imbalanced
treatment of the parties, not allowing parties to speak, and disrespectful
conduct toward one or both of the parties. Thus, in addition to the expansion
of existing contractual doctrines, our communitarian theory proposes
developing special contractual doctrines that provide the parties with suitable
protection against improper mediator conduct. 165 The common cases of
extreme and invasive legal evaluation of a dispute by the mediator are
illustrative of how vital this protection is.166 Under our communitarian
161 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 (1981) ("If a party's
manifestation of assent is induced by an improper threat by the other party that leaves the
victim no reasonable alternative, the contract is voidable by the victim.").
162 See, e.g., Chitkara v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 45 Fed. App'x 53 (2d Cir. 2002);
Brinkerhoff v. Campbell, 994 P.2d 911 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000).
163 See In re Marriage of Banks, 887 S.W.2d 160, 163-64 (Tex. App. 1994).
164 See Vitakis-Valchine v. Valchine, 793 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
165 Thus, in contrast to current law, see, for example, Wolf v. Wolf, No. B177351,
2006 WL 171513 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2006), under our regime, claims of mediator
partiality should impact the validity of the post-mediation contract.
166 In mediation literature, there is resistance to mediator evaluations of disputes.
See, e.g., Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, Mapping Mediation: The Risks of
Riskin's Grid, 3 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 71 (1998) (arguing that the definition of
mediation should not include evaluative services); Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love,
"Evaluative" Mediation Is an Oxymoron, 14 ALTERNATIVES HIGH COST LITIG. 31 (1996)
(arguing that the acts of evaluation and of mediation contradict one another); Lela P.
Love, The Top Ten Reasons Why Mediators Should Not Evaluate, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
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theory, the public regulation of the mediating parties' relationship should
include not only a restriction of the mediator's authority to provide a legal
evaluation of the dispute,167 but must also provide contractual remedies in
the context of the parties' internal relationship in the event of a violation of
this restriction. For example, when the mediator expresses a firm legal
opinion of the dispute, predicts the court's decision, and leads the parties to
settle the case on the basis of this prediction, there should be a legal premise
of a flaw in the formation of the subsequent post-mediation contract, making
it voidable by the parties. There could, of course, be exceptions to this
presumption. One exception, for example, could be when the mediator made
his evaluation with the advance formal and informed consent of both the
mediating parties. 168 A second exception could be when court approval has
been given to the settlement agreement after careful review of its fairness.169
The premise could also fall if the mediating parties were effectively
represented 70 by counsel during the negotiations and at the time of the
contract making. And finally, when no causal link exists between the
937, 937-38 (1997) (analyzing why evaluative activities are inconsistent with the
mediator's role); E. Patrick McDermott & Ruth Obar, "What's Going On" in Mediation:
An Empirical Analysis of the Influence of a Mediator's Style on Party Satisfaction and
Monetary Benefit, 9 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 75 (2004) (finding that both claimants and
respondents rate facilitative mediation more favorably than evaluative mediation).
Moreover, a great many of those scholars who do not oppose mediator evaluations
nonetheless insist on subjecting them to conditions and restrictions. See, e.g., John Lande,
How Will Lawyering and Mediation Practices Transform Each Other?, 24 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 839 (1997) (claiming that it is impossible to remove the evaluation from the
definition of the mediation procedure, but it is important that it be performed only with
the parties' consent); L. Randolph Lowry, To Evaluate or Not: That Is Not the Question!,
38 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 48 (2000) (expressing awareness of the limitations
of mediator dispute evaluation, while making concrete proposals for its implementation);
Donald T. Weckstein, In Praise of Party Empowerment-and of Mediator Activism, 33
WILLAMEITE L. REV. 501 (1997) (claiming that mediation evaluation can be allowed, but
subject to guaranteeing the parties' self-determination in the mediation); Welsh, supra
note 2 (supporting "soft" versions of mediator evaluation and that it be performed only at
an advanced stage of the mediation).
16 7 See, e.g., MODEL STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY AND DIVORCE
MEDIATION (2000), available at http://www.mediate.com/articles/afccstds.cfn
(emphasizing in its overview that Family mediation is not a substitute for the need for
family members to obtain independent legal advice).
168 For the justification for setting formal requirements for post-mediation contracts,
see supra Part IV.B.3.
169 This exception would require this would entail a deeper examination by the
courts. See supra Part IV.B.3.
170 See Welsh, supra note 2, at 838.
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mediator's evaluation and the formation of the post-mediation contract, the
contract will be enforceable.
C. Judicial Review, Confidentiality and the Unique Nature of
Mediation
Our proposed communitarian regime results, overall, in heightened
judicial review of mediation. Above we addressed the concern that such a
regime could potentially generate satellite litigation and suggested a
mechanism for minimizing this phenomenon.171 In this section, we turn to
the other concern we raised: the potential clash between ex post judicial
review and the confidentiality requirement in mediation.
The mediation confidentiality requirement is intended to prevent the
disclosure and revealing of information regarding what occurred in the
mediation proceedings' 72 and to inhibit mediators from testifying about the
mediation in court. 173 This requirement is of considerable importance in the
legal regulation of the mediation procedure;174 indeed, the majority of the
current regulation of mediation focuses on confidentiality.175 Undoubtedly,
confidentiality plays an important role in mediation, as it allows the parties to
express themselves candidly and to raise possible resolutions to the dispute
without fear of ramifications for future litigation. 176 Confidentiality also
contributes to the parties' self-determination, mutual trust, and the perception
of mediators as neutral.177 Our proposed regulation regime would seem, on
171 See supra Part IV.B.2.
172 See, e.g., Ellen E. Deason, Predictable Mediation Confidentiality in the US.
Federal System, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. REsOL. 239, 243-52 (2002) (providing
background on the importance of confidentiality in the mediation setting and outlining
competing values that can justify disclosure of mediation communications in subsequent
litigation proceedings).
173 See, e.g., UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT § 6(c) (2003) (allowing the mediator to
decline to testify or otherwise provide evidence). But see Olam v. Congress Mortgage
Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (D.Cal. 1999) (allowing the mediator to testify in the special
circumstances of the case).
174 See UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT (2003) (preamble and legislative commentary).
175 See Joseph B. Stulberg, The UMA: Some Roads Not Taken, 2003 J. DISP. REsOL.
221 (asserting that due to its focus on mediator confidentiality, the UMA failed to address
other important issues).
176 See UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT, Prefatory Note (2001) (candor during mediation
is encouraged by maintaining the parties' and mediators' expectations regarding
confidentiality of mediation communications).
177 See Scott H. Hughes, The Unform Mediation Act: To the Spoiled Go the
Privileges, 85 MARQ. L. REv. 9, 68 (2001) (discussing confidentiality and self-
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its face, to undermine the confidentiality doctrine in advocating ex post
judicial review of the mediation proceedings. Yet the harm generated by our
proposal would be less than what would initially appear to be assumed, and
moreover, this harm could be minimized with the adoption of certain
mechanisms.
First, even today, contractual claims between parties are recognized in
many jurisdictions as exceptions to the confidentiality principle.178 Thus, our
model, in this context, conforms to the existing trend.179
Second, a significant portion of our proposal addresses mediator conduct.
Mediator misconduct is a well-accepted exception to the confidentially
principle even today.' 80 Our model steps beyond prevailing law in arguing
that mediator conduct should not only be disclosed in cases of claims against
mediators, but also in cases regarding the post-mediation. Yet mediator
conduct is not fully protected even today.18 '
determination in mediation); Izumi & La Rue, supra note 118 (discussing the core values
of mediation: party self-determination, confidentiality, and third-party neutrality).
178 See UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT § 6(b)(2), Reporter's Notes (2001) ("This
exception is designed to preserve traditional contract defenses to the enforcement of the
mediated settlement agreement that relate to the integrity of the mediation process, which
otherwise would be unavailable if based on mediation communications."); see also
Damon v. United Parcel Service, No. 04-CV-746S, 2009 WL 67368, at *1 (W.D.N.Y.
Jan. 9, 2009) (referring to claims regarding party conduct during mediation, without
treating the information as confidential in light of the district court's local rules); James
R. Coben & Peter N. Thompson, Disputing Irony: A Systematic Look at Litigation about
Mediation, 11 HARv. NEGOT. L. REv. 43, 48 (2006) (noting that courts often consider
evidence of what transpired during mediation); Dickey, supra note 133 (reviewing cases
in which the court permitted disclosure regarding the mediation process despite
confidentiality rules and calling for increased confidentiality in mediation through
recognition of a narrow mediation exclusionary rule).
179 See ME. R. EVID. 514 (2009), available at
http://www.courts.state.me.us/rulesformsfees/rules/MREvid%20Amend514-10-22.pdf
(leaving the exchanges of parties in joint mediation sessions open for admissibility in
litigation). However, these rules were withdrawn on January 1, 2010.
(http://www.courts.state.me.us/rules formsfees/rules/MREvid408514Amend.pdf).
180 See, e.g., UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT § 6(a)(5) (2003) ("There is no privilege
under Section 4 for a mediation communication that is: ... (5) sought or offered to prove
or disprove a claim or complaint of professional misconduct or malpractice filed against a
mediator."); see also Olam v. Congress Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D.Cal.
1999) (allowing mediator to testify regarding mediation); Coben & Thompson, supra
note 178 (reviewing sixty-seven opinions detailing or alluding to direct testimony or
affidavits from mediators).
181 See Hughes, supra note 177, at 64-66 (noting that under the UMA, while a
mediator may testify in a judicial proceeding arising from a complaint of mediator
malpractice, none of the parties can call the mediator in an action involving contractual
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Third, there are a number of possible mechanisms that could minimize
the harm to mediation confidentially in circumstances of ex post judicial
review of the post-mediation contract. For example, when a party to the
mediation makes claims regarding what transpired during the mediation,
these claims should not be deliberated by the judge who sent the parties to
mediation and to whom they are supposed to return. 182 Another option would
be to conduct both our proposed ex ante substantive judicial approval as well
as the ex post judicial review behind closed doors. 183 Finally, should our
proposal be adopted, it would significantly diminish ex post litigation over
mediation and minimize the damage to confidentiality.
We do concede that some tension exists between the mediation
confidentiality principle and intensified judicial review that results from our
communitarian approach. Yet we maintain that the harm to confidentiality is
necessary and justified in light of the public responsibility for mediation. It is
of greater concern to us, instead, that unrestricted confidentiality will turn
mediation into a haven for law breakers, likely leading to exploitation of
power imbalances, undermining of social values, and externalities.184
The criticism of mediation confidentiality intensifies substantially in the
context of the regulation of the post-mediation contract. The insistence on
confidentiality makes the public scrutiny of the contract sometimes even
narrower than what is allowed under conventional contract law, as it prevents
details of what transpires in mediation from being revealed. Consequently,
mediation confidentiality is likely to preclude even conventional contract
nullification grounds due to flaws in the contract making.'8 5
misconduct, but "[a]n astute lawyer, upon examining these two provisions [6(a)(5) and
6(b)(2)], will naturally conclude that the mediator needs to be joined as a co-defendant. If
a plaintiff is unable to depose the mediator in a simple lawsuit against the other party, this
problem can easily be overcome by suing the mediator as well. After joining the
mediator, all of the individuals in the mediation, mediator included, can be deposed.").
182 See Weston, supra note 133, at 77-78 (suggesting such a mechanism).
183 See, e.g., UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT § 6(b)(2) (2003).
184 See Christopher R. Drahozal & Laura J. Hines, Secret Settlement Restrictions
and Unintended Consequences, 54 KAN. L. REv. 1457 (2006) (evaluating the likely
consequences of restrictions on secret settlements); David Luban, Settlement and the
Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619 (1995) (asserting that settlement reduces
the public's role in dispute resolution, reduces the use of rules and precedents, and leads
to an erosion of the public realm); cf Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It
Anyway?: A Philosophical and Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83
GEO. L.J. 2663 (1995) (contesting Luban's proposition that democratic discourse requires
full disclosure of legal dispute information).
185 See In re Acceptance Ins. Co., 33 S.W.3d 443, 451-54 (Tex. App. 2000) ("[Tlhe
manner in which participants negotiate should not be disclosed to the trial court."); see
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Mediation confidentiality conflicts with a communitarian theory that
seeks to bolster public responsibility for mediation. Our model is consistent
with new trends towards softening mediation confidentiality in general,186
while including a specific assertion that contractual claims that challenge the
moral basis of mediation should be heard despite the requirement for
confidentiality.
Before concluding, we would like to address another possible concern,
namely, that deep regulation and intense judicial review will blur the
difference between mediation and court litigation and undermine the unique
character of mediation. We do agree with the aspiration to construct
mediation as an autonomous procedure, distinct from the conventional legal
procedure. Yet in our opinion, judicial review of mediation and the post-
mediation contract, if implemented properly, will not undermine mediation's
core values. Quite the contrary, a central factor that distinguishes mediation
from other judicial procedures is that it highlights the parties' autonomy and
fosters their ability to formulate agreement that is suited to their preferences.
This is in contrast with the general legal rules which operate in a "one-size-
fits-all" manner. The procedural justice principles, especially the parties'
self-determination and their opportunity to participate in the decisionmaking
process, are conditional and necessary for the implementation of mediation
objectives.
also Foxgate Homeowners' Ass'n v. Bramalea Cal., Inc., 25 P.3d 1117, 1119 (Cal. 2001)
("Neither a mediator nor a party may reveal communications made during mediation.");
Vick v. Waits, No. 05-00-01122-CV, 2002 WL 1163842, at *3 (Tex. App. June 4, 2002)
("The Texas ADR Act does not include an exception for claims of fraud, and this Court
will not create an exception to the confidentiality provisions of the Texas ADR Act.
Because all of the alleged misrepresentations were made during mediation, these
statements are confidential..."); Annalisa L.H. Peterson, When Mediation
Confidentiality and Substantive Law Clash: An Inquiry into the Impact of In re Marriage
of Kieturakis on California's Confidentiality Law, 8 PEPP. Disp. RESOL. L.J. 199 (2007)
(discussing In re Marriage of Kieturakis and noting that the court decision both upheld
California's historically strict standard of confidentiality and reduced the scope of the
state's presumption that unequal marital settlements were achieved through undue
influence). However, courts often do not refrain from a discussion of claims regarding
improper conduct or flaws in the contract-making in mediation, and in doing so, setting
aside the requirement of confidentiality and allowing the parties to bring evidence and
testimony regarding what transpired over the course of the mediation proceedings. See
supra note 178.
186 See supra notes 178-79; see also Robert Timothy Reagan, The Hunt for Sealed
Settlement Agreements, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 439 (2006) (finding that in practice,
settlement agreement confidentiality in mediation and in general is adhered to only with
respect to financial details).
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As this article has shown, the existing regulation of mediation does not
enable substantive enforcement of procedural justice rules. In fact, it is the
existing regulation that might harm the mediation vision.187 In contrast, the
legal regime we offer, grounded on both procedural and substantives justice
principles and on inclusive legal supervision of their implementation, will
lead to the realization of the mediation goals.
V. CONCLUSION
The emergence of mediation as a prevalent dispute resolution procedure
has given rise to great debate between mediation's proponents and
opponents. We are numbered with the former camp. Our support for
mediation is based not only on such instrumental reasons as reducing court
congestion, but also, and mainly, on mediation's unique character, in
particular its emphasis on party autonomy and freedom. Our support for
mediation overlaps with a general pluralistic viewpoint that calls for a
multiplicity of public institutions1 88 and, specifically, dispute resolution
institutions.189
From a communitarian and judicial pluralism perspective, we recognize
that unrestricted privatization of social and legal institutions might lead to
harm being inflicted on society's weaker segments.1 9 0 In a similar vein, we
are concerned that, without regulation and judicial review, powerful parties
will abuse mediation to further their needs and the voices of weak and
inexperienced parties will not be heard. Therefore, this article joins in the call
for more scrupulous regulation of mediation.
Under conventional approaches, the regulation of mediation is still an
exception, and mediation, as a whole, particularly the post-mediation
contract, is perceived as private. Our analysis shows that the principles of
finality and mediation confidentiality have eroded judicial review of the post-
187 See, e.g., Riskin & Welsh, supra note 114, at 867 (discussing the gap between
aspiration and reality in court-oriented mediation).
I88 See Shahar Lifshitz, Married Against Their Will? Toward a Pluralist Regulation
of Spousal Relationship, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1565 (2010) (arguing that the law
should encourage diversity of spousal institution).
189 See Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 869 (1988)
(describes legal pluralism); see also Bryan Caplan & Edward P. Stringham, Privatizing
the Adjudication of Disputes, 9 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 503 (2008) (supporting the
privatizing of dispute resolution).
190 See, e.g. Susan M. Okin, Feminism and Multiculturalism: Some Tensions, 108
ETHICS 661 (1998) (opposing multiculturalism from feministic perspective).
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mediation contract to an even lesser level than judicial review of regular
private contracts.
In contrast with the conventional approach, this article, resting on social-
psychological and public policy analyses, proposes a communitarian
conception of mediation and the post-mediation contract. Our analysis
demonstrates that the parties perceive mediation (specifically court-annexed
mediation) as a community act that has a huge impact on their status in the
group and on their self-identity. Our analysis also reveals the moral
responsibility of the community for the mediation procedure and its
consequences. Based on a communitarian theory, this article proposes a
comprehensive model for public regulation of mediation. Unlike the current
regulatory regime, we present coherent regulation that relates both to the
mediator-parties relations and to the mediating parties' internal relationship,
including the post-mediation contract.
The proposed regulation does not deny the unique character of mediation
and ignore the difference between mediation and court procedures. Rather, it
offers communitarian legal regulation that is suited to mediation and its
unique qualities. Hence, the article suggests a unique contract law regime to
deal with post-mediation contracts. This regime expands the duty to
participate in good faith beyond what currently exists in prevailing law. We
also offer more possibilities for nullifying post-mediation contracts in
instances of procedural justice violations, even when these violations are not
covered by standard contract law doctrines regarding flaws in contact
formation. In addition, the communitarian theory connects between the
mediator-parties relations and the mediating parties' internal relationship.
Thus, in certain circumstances, the parties could invalidate both the
mediation and the post-mediation contract due to violations on the part of the
mediator. Finally, we have offered here an innovative mechanism giving the
parties the option to submit the post-mediation contract for court approval.
We showed that adopting such a mechanism would minimize the harm that
could be caused to mediation finality and confidentially, without forfeiting
public supervision of mediation.
The days in which mediation was perceived as threat to the legal system
are long gone. Today, modern law, including the conventional judicial
system, encourages mediation in many ways. We support this trend.
However, we believe that the legal promotion of mediation must be
complemented by enhanced public responsibility for the process. In our
view, modern law cannot send people to mediation and then close its eyes to
violations of procedural or substantive justice within its framework.
Therefore, the challenge of modern mediation law is to preserve the
uniqueness of mediation as an autonomy-based mechanism distinct from
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formal litigation while ensuring community responsibility for its contents.
The regulatory regime laid out in this article is a first step towards meeting
this challenge.
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